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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Crime and public housing are closely linked in the popular and political 
imagination, and have been so for nearly 50 years.  It should be no surprise, then, that 
public housing has been a focus of policy interest by lawmakers as well as academics, 
and strategic interest by legal actors, especially the police.  Throughout this time, a nearly 
intractable popular fear of urban public housing projects1 has led to a variety of law 
enforcement tactics that place both residents and visitors under a very specific police 
gaze. This gaze has led to efforts to “contain” residents as well as to closely surveil 
visitors and neighbors from the surrounding communities who venture into its perimeter.  
Relying on theories of order maintenance and on the recent jurisprudence of high 
crime areas,2 police have adopted tactics that raise complex questions of legality and 
fairness.  In recent years, for example, public housing residents have faced systematic, 
suspicionless searches of their homes,3 banishment statutes,4 and an increase in incidents 
of police misconduct.5  
                                                         
1 See Michael H. Schill, Distressed Public Housing:  Where Do We Go from Here?, 60 U. Chi. L. Rev. 
497, 497 (1993) (“Scarcely a day goes by without reports in the media about the . . . problems that plague 
some publicly-owned housing developments.  Accounts of appalling apartment conditions, corrupt 
administrators, and innocent bystanders killed by gang warfare are commonplace.  Negative images of 
public housing have even found their way into popular culture.”).  See also Sarah N. Kelly, Separating the 
Criminals from the Community:  Procedural Remedies for “Innocent Owners” in Public Housing 
Authorities, 51 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 379, 382 (2006) (referring to public housing as a “dangerous 
environment”); Andrew Byers, Note, The Special Government Needs Exception:  Does it Allow for 
Warrantless Searches of Public Housing?, 41 Wayne L. Rev. 1469, 1469 (1995) (comparing the conditions 
within public housing to a “war zone”).  See also Jeffrey Fagan et al., The Paradox of the Drug Elimination 
Program in New York City Public Housing, 13 Geo. J. Poverty L. & Pol’y 415, 415--16 (2006) [hereinafter 
Fagan, DEP] (“In the last twenty years, the notion that public housing is, by its physical and social design, a 
dangerous milieu has been reinforced by rare but widely publicized episodes of youth violence, sequential 
drug epidemics, and elevated rates of drug-related violence.”). 
2 Under current Supreme Court doctrine, those living in “high crime areas” receive less robust protection 
from the Fourth Amendment than do those in areas with lower crime rates.  Andrew Guthrie Ferguson & 
Damien Bernache, The “High-Crime Area” Question:  Requiring Verifiable and Quantifiable Evidence for 
ourth Amendment Reasonable Suspicion Analysis, 57 Am. U. L. Rev. 1587, 1588 (2008).   F
3 See Sudhir Alladi Venkatesh, American Project 129--130 (2000) (describing the searches conducted by 
the Chicago Housing Authority and the Chicago Police Department as part of operation clean sweep). 
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In New York, the negative attention to public housing took the form of intensive 
enforcement of trespass statutes.  Together with widespread marijuana enforcement6 and 
extensive use of Terry stops (known as Stop, Question and Frisk, or SQF),7 trespass 
enforcement was one of the core engines of Order Maintenance Policing, the influential 
policing model that has been credited with lowering crime rates in New York and that has 
been adopted by police agencies across the country.8  The results in New York are stark: 
over 35,000 trespass arrests each year since 1995, most in public housing, and few that 
lead to convictions.9  
As with its strategic and policy predecessors, trespass enforcement in public 
housing was animated by the empirical and theoretical connection between drug selling 
and crime.  But the modern version is a significant departure strategically from past 
public housing interventions to eliminate drug use and disrupt drug markets.  Past efforts 
focused on evictions of tenants who were implicated in the drug business, as well as 
undercover drug buys in and around public housing to disrupt drug selling enterprises.  
This form of  “retail” enforcement had limited success through a succession of drug 
epidemics since the 1960s.  Trespass enforcement was something new: a larger scale 
effort that was “wholesale” in two ways: its scope and reach, and the fact that it was 
implemented as a pre-emptive engagement with would-be offenders.  The similarity in 
the patterns of street stops and trespass arrests under OMP have led to characterizations 
of trespass as a special version of Broken Windows theory with limited application to 
public housing.10  In this vein, people moving about in the hallways and stairwells of 
    
4 See generally Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113 (2003) (finding that the trespass policy of the Richmond 
Redevelopment and Housing Authority, which banned certain individuals from housing authority property, 
id not violate the First Amendment rights of non-residents banished from the property). d
5 In New York City, for example, complaints filed with the civilian review board increased sixty-six 
percent between 2002 and 2006.  New York City Civilian Complaint Review Board, Status Report January-
-June 2007, at 11 (2007), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/ccrb/pdf/ccrbsemi_2007_Jan_June.pdf.  
Similarly, San Francisco has seen a “gradual increase in complaints of police misconduct.”  The First 
Amendment and Police Misconduct:  Criminal Penalty for Filing Complaints Against Police Officers, 27 
amline L. Rev. 225, 239 (2004).  H
 Levine and Small; Harcourt and Ludwig, Golub and  Johnson, Geller and Fagan 6
 Spitzer, 1999; Waldeck, 2000; Harcourt 2001; Garnett 2005 and in press 7
 Skogan and Frydl, 2004; Kubrin et al., 2010 8
ronx Defenders data, Legal Aid data 9 B
10 Wilson and Kelling, Taylor, Garnett, others 
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public housing are a manifestation of underlying crime and disorder problems that 
justifies aggressive, pre-emptive policing.  
Just as OMP gave rise to equal protection concerns because of its racial and 
spatial concentration,11 the totality of trespass enforcement runs similar risks based on its 
shared policy and tactical foundations. And because of the social fact of the demography 
of public housing – predominantly non-white, poor and young residents  – the trespass-
OMP link in public housing has led to claims of racial disparities in trespass 
enforcement.12  These fears are compounded by the ease and low legal burden needed to 
engage a citizen-suspect for a high discretion crime such as trespass.  In other words, 
trespass stops and arrests seem to be based not on the necessary predicate for stops – 
reasonable suspicion – but on broad-based high discretion police stops and interdictions 
of both residents and visitors alike at relatively low levels of categorically defined 
suspicion. This, in turn, has led to claims of widespread Fourth Amendment violations. 
These issues are the focus of this article. They take on additional normative and 
constitutional importance in light of the limited efficacy of OMP in preventing more 
serious crime,13 the observed racial disparities in its implementation,14 and the history of 
constitutional concerns that have surrounded the policy.15  We use a quasi-experiment to 
assess claims of racial disparities in trespass enforcement, and capitalize on variation in 
the siting of public housing across the city to determine if, compared to its immediate and 
adjacent neighbors, there are observable differences in trespass enforcement, and the 
extent to which these differences are attributable to race or differences in other relevant 
characteristics, especially patterns of crime, in the surrounding areas. 
 The article proceeds in four sections.  First, we review the history of efforts to 
control crime in public housing.  These efforts, which focused largely on evictions, date 
back to the heroin epidemics of the 1960s that coincided with the first of three sharp 
crime shocks to legal institutions as well as to the polity.  Next, we examine the legal and 
ls of the trespass enforcement regime as practiced in New 
      
11
 LDF complaint, newspaper stories 
 Spitzer, 1999; Daniels v City of New York consent decree, 2003 
12
 Harcourt, 2000; Ludwig and Harcourt, 2006; Rosenfeld et al., 2007; but see Corman and Mocan (2003) 13
 Spitzer, 1999; Gelman Fagan and Kiss, 2007, Fagan and Davies, 2000; Fagan et al. 2010 14
15 Daniels v City of New York, 2003. 
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York.  The fact that the implementation of this design required a statutory modification of 
the state’s trespass law is a sign of the commitment by legal actors to pursuing this tactic.  
We then discuss the details of the empirical test and present the result.  The evidence 
shows that there is a racial disparity in trespass enforcement that cannot be explained by 
its crime predicates.  While not providing evidence of intentional discrimination, we offer 
the test as a process of ruling out counterfactuals – violent or drug crimes, specifically – 
that are the predicates for the policy.  We find that trespass enforcement is a function of 
the Black population in public housing, even after accounting for those counterfactuals.  
We offer brief concluding thoughts on the costs of trespass enforcement that are borne by 





A.  Crime in Public Housing 
 Public housing in the U.S. evolved in the 1930s as a benevolent social experiment 
to alleviate slum conditions and benefit mostly (white) working class populations in 
American cities. It also was a Great Depression Era public works projects designed to 
both employ Americans and provide housing for those suffering from the economic 
downturn.16  “In its infancy, public housing was used primarily as a tool that allowed 
families on the road to the middle class a way station in which to acquire the necessary 
economic status to move on.”17  Public housing expanded after World War II to assist the 
poor and working poor to escape “slum” conditions. Much of this second wave of 
housing projects was clusters of high rise towers that were sited in neighborhoods already 
in the midst of significant social structural change.18   
 But since that time, public housing has become increasingly problematized 
through the bifocal lenses of race and crime. Beginning in the 1950s, public housing 
 political conflict as white working class families in public 
      
16 Gordon Cavanaugh, Public Housing:  From Archaic to Dynamic to Endangered, 14 J. Affordable 
ousing & Community Dev. L. 228, 229 (2005).   H
egory J. Delone, Public Housing and the Fear of Crime, 36 J. Crim. Just. 115, 115 (2008). 17 Gr
18 More recently, public housing design began to include low slung garden apartments, but these also were 




housing were replaced by poor non-whites.19 This occurred (more or less) in parallel with 
the fundamental economic transformation of cities in the 1950s as manufacturing and 
unskilled labor jobs began to migrate to other regions of the U.S. and eventually out of 
the country.20 As the white population in public housing in New York and elsewhere 
continued to decline,21 these structures looked more and more like reservations for the 
city’s poorest residents of color.  The racial threat of concentrated minority populations in 
public housing signaled ‘danger’ for older, declining white populations, both those 
already in public housing and in the surrounding neighborhoods.22  This coerced racial 
heterogeneity led to social conflicts in a wide range of social policy domains such as 
housing, education (school busing), and welfare policy.23 By the 1960s, public housing 
had grown to symbolize the dangers of inner city urban life, and was labeled as a place 
requiring greater surveillance and social control. By 1970, public housing had become 
known, somewhat ominously and unfairly, as “government ghettos.”24 
 The popular and political image of public housing hardened further as crime rates 
rose. Just as public housing construction boomed in the 1950s, crime rates in 
neighborhoods with public housing sites had begun to climb, and rapid population change 
and economic decline had changed the fortunes of neighborhood residents for the 
      
19 Peter Marcuse, Interpreting Public Housing History, 12 Journal of Architectural and Planning Research 
0 (1995 24
20 Wilson, The Truly Disadvantaged (1987); Wilson, When Work Disappears (1996) 
21 NYCHA’s black population was only 4.7% in 1930 and 12.4% in 1940.  Nicholas Dagen Bloom, Public 
Housing That Worked:  New York in the Twentieth Century 88 (2008).  At this time, there was an almost 
non-existent Latino population in public housing and, even in 1945, whites made up 85% of NYCHA 
residents.  Id. at 89.  By 1974, however, NYCHA residents were 14.1% white, 57.7% black, and 28.2% 
Puerto Rican.”  Id. at 175.  Today, NYCHA’s white population has dwindled to less than 5%.  New York 
City Housing Authority, Comprehensive Annual Financial Report for the Year Ended December 31, 2008, 
at 104 (2009).   
22 For example, the Black population  in public housing in New York was only 4.7% in 1930 and 12.4% in 
1940.  Nicholas Dagen Bloom, Public Housing That Worked:  New York in the Twentieth Century 88 
(2008).  At this time, there was an almost non-existent Latino population in public housing and, even in 
1945, whites made up 85% of NYCHA residents.  Id. at 89.  By 1974, however, NYCHA residents were 
14.1% white, 57.7% black, and 28.2% Puerto Rican.”  Id. at 175.  Today, NYCHA’s white population has 
dwindled to less than 5%.  New York City Housing Authority, Comprehensive Annual Financial Report for 
 Year Ended December 31, 2008, at 104 (2009).   the
23 Katz, The Undeserving Poor; Massey and Denton, American Apartheid (1993); Richard Perlestein, 
Nixonland (2008) 
24 Wallace F. Smith, Housing:  The Social and Economic Elements 477 (1970) 
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worse.25  A heroin epidemic began in New York and other large metropolitan areas in the 
mid-1960s and continued into the early 1970s.26 Initially, the heroin epidemic received 
little mainstream attention, but that changed in the late 1960s when, due to fear of urban 
crime and heroin use among American military personnel in Vietnam, it became defined 
as a threat.”27  Crime rose concurrently, and perhaps somewhat causally, as homicides 
tripled from 1967-1973.28  Riots in minority neighborhoods in 47 American cities in 
1967-8 reinforced both the threat of crime and racialized (however inaccurately) its 
narrative.29 
 Although crime risks in public housing at the time were no greater than in their 
surrounding neighborhoods, public housing in the late 1960s was, by its physical and 
social design, seen as a dangerous milieu and a crime hot spot.  In the 1970s, that 
perception was spread and reinforced by rare but widely publicized episodes of youth 
violence,30 sequential drug epidemics,31 and elevated rates of drug-related violence.32 
With the crack epidemic in the mid-1980s, the high rise towers of large, isolated, and 
ominous public housing projects came to symbolize drug and crime problems.  Stylized 
social facts on crime and public housing in the 1990s tended to further strengthen those 
perceptions. f Chicago’s public housing system by HUD in 1995, a 
      
25 See, for example, Alex Kotlowitz, THERE ARE NO CHILDREN HERE (1990); Nicholas Lemann, THE 
PROMISED LAND (1991).  Also, see earlier sociological works by Lee Rainwater, BEHIND GHETTO WALLS 
(1966), Ulf Hannerz, SOULSIDE (1969), and James Garbarino, CHILDREN AND FAMILIES IN THE SOCIAL 
VIRONMENT (1992).   EN
26 Don C. Des Jarlais & Gopal S. Uppal, Heroin Activity in New York City, 1970-1978, 7 Am. J. Drug & 
cohol Abuse 335, 336 (1980). Al
27 Michael Agar & Heather Schacht Reisinger, A Heroin Epidemic at the Intersection of Histories:  The 
60s Epidemic Among African Americans in Baltimore, 21 Medical Anthropology 189, 191 (2002). 19
 Erik Monkennen, Roger Lane, Zimring and Hawkins, others 28
 Kerner Commission, Eisenhower Commission Reports 29
 Kotlowitz, Time Magazine piece from July 77 30
 CITES 31
 Goldstein et al., Chaiken and Chaiken on ‘predatory violence’ 32
33 See, e.g., Timothy Ireland et al., Violence Among Adolescents Living In Public Housing: A Two-Site 
Analysis, 3 Criminology and Public Policy 3 (2003); Susan Popkin, et al., THE HIDDEN WAR: THE BATTLE 
TO CONTROL CRIME IN PUBLIC HOUSING IN CHICAGO (2000); Tamara Dumanovsky et al., Neighborhood 
Contexts of Crime in New York City’s Public Housing, Presented at the September Research Institute on 
Neighborhood Effects on Low-Income Families, Joint Center for Poverty Research, The University of 
Chicago and Northwestern University (1999).  Recent efforts by HUD to conduct victimization surveys in 
public housing projects suggest elevated rates, but with a host of methodological artifacts and complexities.  
See, for example, Harold R Holzman and Lanny Piper, Measuring Crime in Public Housing: 
Methodological Issues and Research Strategies, 14 Journal of Quantitative Criminology 331 (1998); 
Race and Selective Enforcement in Public Housing – Workshop Draft  9
more dangerous than either the residents themselves or than the facts can substantiate.  
                                                                                                                                                                    
response in part to intense activity in Chicago public housing by drug gangs,34 reinforced 
these images of public housing in the popular and political imagination.35   
These connections are routinely revisited in the press as a reminder of the 
persistence of drug problems in public housing.36 Public housing, despite its proud 
history,37 is currently portrayed as a dangerous, homogonous, place where crime and 
disorder run rampant.38  This perception is reinforced by both academic39 and media40 
portrayals of public housing and leads to a situation where outsiders – those not 
intimately familiar with the neighborhoods themselves – perceive those communities as 
41  
 
Harold R Holzman, Criminological Research on Public Housing: Toward a Better Understanding of 
ople, Places and Spaces, 42 Crime and Delinquency  361 (1996). Pe
34  See, for example, Sudhir Alli Venkatesh, AMERICAN PROJECT: THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN 
 (2000). GHETTO
35 Judy A. England-Joseph, HUD's takeover of the Chicago Housing Authority, statement to the 
Subcommittee on Housing and Community Opportunity, Committee on Banking and Financial Services, 
use of Representatives, 1995. Ho
36 See, for example, N.R. Kleinfeld, With Drugs in Open, Elderly Live Behind Locks, New York Times, 
May 2, 2004, at 41 (describing drugs and violence in Harborview Terrace Houses on the west side of 
Manhattan, primarily by illegal tenants in a housing complex with a high proportion of elderly residents). 
37 Public housing, which got its start during the Great Depression, was originally seen as a way in which a 
family, seeking entry into the middle class, could build stability and save money before moving on to 
bigger and better things.  See Gregory J. DeLone, Public Housing and the Fear of Crime, 36 J. Crim. Just. 
115, 115 (2008).  See, also, Nicholas Dagen Bloom, Public Housing That Worked:  New York in the 
Twentieth Century 88 (2008). 
38 Bloom, id. (“[P]ublic housing is more often than not also portrayed by the media as rife with crime and 
disorder.” (internal quotations omitted)). 
39 See Andrew Byers, Note, The Special Government Needs Exception: Does It Allow for Warrantless 
Searches of Public Housing?, 41 Wayne L. Rev. 1469, 1469 (1995) (comparing conditions within public 
housing to “war zone”); Sarah N. Kelly, Note, Separating the Criminals from the Community: Procedural 
Remedies for “Innocent Owners” in Public Housing Authorities, 51 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 379, 382 (2006) 
(referring to public housing as a “dangerous environment”).  See, Ireland et al, supra. 
40 See Jeffrey Fagan et al., The Paradox of the Drug Elimination Program in New York City Public 
Housing, 13 Geo. J. Poverty L. & Pol'y 415, 415-16 (2006) (“In the last twenty years, the notion that public 
housing is, by its physical and social design, a dangerous milieu has been reinforced by rare but widely 
publicized episodes of youth violence, sequential drug epidemics, and elevated rates of drug-related 
violence.”); Michael H. Schill, Distressed Public Housing: Where Do We Go from Here?, 60 U. Chi. L. 
Rev. 497, 497 (1993) (“Scarcely a day goes by without reports in the media about the... problems that 
plague some publicly-owned housing developments. Accounts of appalling apartment conditions, corrupt 
administrators, and innocent bystanders killed by gang warfare are commonplace. Negative images of 
public housing have even found their way into popular culture.” (footnotes omitted)). 
41 See Lincoln Quillian & Devah Pager, Black Neighbors, Higher Crime?  The Role of Racial Stereotypes 
in Evaluations of Neighborhood Crime, 107 Am. J. Soc. 717, 749 (2001) (“[O]ur results suggest that whites 
(and Latinos) systematically overestimate the extent to which percentage black and neighborhood crime 
rates are associated; this association persists even when official crime rates are controlled.”); Robert J. 
Sampson & Stephen W. Raudenbush, Seeing Disorder:  Neighborhood Stigma and the Social Construction 
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The result is that, to the outside world, public housing – and those who live there – is 
readily viewed as the focal point of criminality in a neighborhood and, regardless of 
whether such a perception is justified, that understanding has been used for more than 
three decades to justify intrusive police tactics targeting crime occurring within the 
buildings.42   
 
B.  Law and Social Control in Public Housing 
 Beginning in the 1960s, several features of drug law and policy in that era 
specifically targeted public housing, and expressed the deeply held connection between 
public housing, crime and drugs.43 That suspicion has led to policing tactics that have 
targeted public housing in ways unheard of in other apartment buildings.44 
 Initially, the heroin epidemic received little mainstream attention.  Public scrutiny 
came “in the late 1960s when, due to fear of urban crime and heroin use among American 
military personnel in Vietnam, it became defined as a threat.”45  Before the peak of the 
epidemic, drug exchanges mostly "existed in private domains:  drug[s] were bought, sold 
 
of “Broken Windows,” 67 Soc. Psychol. Q. 319, 336 (2004) (finding “social structure” is a “powerful 
predictor of perceived disorder”); see also id. at 329--30 (“[C]oncentrated poverty, proportion black, and 
proportion Latino are related positively and significantly to perceived disorder” while minorities, 
particularly those living within chaotic neighborhoods, have a higher threshold for perceiving disorder). 
42 See, e.g., David G. Lazarus, Here Comes the Neighborhood---Virginia v. Hicks and How the New York 
Legislature Should Empower Law Enforcement with More Powerful Trespass-Barment Statutes as a Tool 
to Combat Crime in Public Housing Projects, 29 Seton Hall Legis. J. 315, 327 (2004) (claiming that “the 
use of every conceivable tool in New York City’s arsenal will be necessary to combat the ever-present 
minal element in its housing projects”).   cri
43 See, for example, the federal Anti-Drug Abuse Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(6) (1994), requiring lease 
terms that give local public housing authorities the discretion to terminate the lease of a tenant when a 
member of the household or a guest engaged in drug-related activity, regardless of whether tenant knew, or 
should have known, of the drug-related activity). Section 5101 of the Act strengthened existing public 
housing lease provisions by including language in the leases to the effect that: “A public housing resident, 
any member of the resident’s household, or a guest or other person under the resident’s control shall not 
engage in criminal activity, including drug-related criminal activity, on or near public housing premises . . . 
d such criminal activity shall be cause for termination of tenancy” (HUD, April 1991).  A resident does 
t need to be convicted of criminal activity to be considered in violation of Section 5101. 
an
no
44 See, e.g., Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113 (2003) (upholding Richman Redevelopment and Housint 
Authority's trespass policy, which banned some individuals from housing authority property); Sudhir Alladi 
Vankatesh, American Project:  The Rise and Fall of a Modern Ghetto 139-30 (2000) (describing 
stematic, warrantless searches of Chicago public housing buildings conducted by the Chicago housing 
thority  and the Chicago Police Department).  
sy
Au
45 Michael Agar & Heather Schacht Reisinger, A Heroin Epidemic at the Intersection of Histories:  The 
1960s Epidemic Among African Americans in Baltimore, 21 Medical Anthropology 189, 191 (2002). 
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and used in discreet settings" and specific locations.46  Taking advantage of anonymity, 
and in close proximity to retail markets, heroin became readily available in “large 
apartment buildings . . . where landlords were not often present.”47 Drug dealers 
attempting to avoid street sweeps by NYPD officers during the crack epidemic would 
later mimic this move to indoor drug sales.48 
Evicting public housing tenants who were participants in or supporters of drug 
dealing was a logical response.  In New York, these evictions were one of the first 
constitutional battles in the use of legal coercion to make public housing safe, and much 
of the early debate centered on the 1971 Escalera consent decree.49  Escalera was a class 
action brought by NYCHA residents challenging, on due process grounds, the procedures 
employed by the housing authority to (1) terminate tenancy on the ground of non-
desirability; (2) terminate tenancy for violation of Housing Authority rules; and (3) assess 
rent augmentations based on "undesirable acts" by tenants.50  The question before the 
court was whether public housing residents had a property interest in their lease, and how 
easily the government could terminate that interest in the face of evidence of drug 
activity.   
Prior to the court's order in Escalera, NYCHA had wide discretion to determine 
who received public housing and who was permitted to remain in it.  "Housing Authority 
managers could apply rigorous, and sometimes subjective or even discriminatory, 
screening criteria to new applicants,"51 and, just as importantly, were able to fast track 
the removal of undesirable tenants through a streamlined administrative process.
 The Escalera consent decree required NYCHA to adhere to a number of 
procedural safeguards before terminating a tenant's lease, including detailed notice of 
      
46 Ric Curtis, Crack, Cocaine and Heroin:  Drug Eras in Williamsburg, Brooklyn, 1960-2000, 11 Addiction 
search & Theory 47, 49 (2003).  See, Panic in Needle Park. Re
 Id. at 50. 47
48 Barbara Boland, The Manhattan Experiment:  Community Prosecution, in Crime and Place:  Plenary 
Papers of the 1997 Conference on Criminal Justice Research and evaluation 51, 52-53 (Nat. Inst. of Justice 
98). 19
49 Escalera v. New York City Housing Authority, 67 Civ. 4307 (S.D.N.Y., Judgment entered Mar. 21, 
71). 19
 Escalera v. New York City Housing Authority, 425 F.2d 853, 857 (2d Cir. 1970). 50
 See Franco, , at 1200. 51
52 White, at 388 n.75 
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charges, and a full evidentiary hearing, complete with a right to cross examine hostile 
witnesses, before terminating tenancy on the grounds of "non-desirability."53  Similarly, 
the Second Circuit also required heightened procedural safeguards before tenancy could 
be terminated for violation of Housing Authority rules.54 The result of Escalera was 
narrowed discretion for building managers to terminate the tenancy of residents they 
didn't approve of, and longer times to remove tenants whom NYCHA was fully-
authorized to terminate.55 
 Both NYCHA and law enforcement institutions attacked the consent decree from 
the beginning.  NYCHA, which litigated its own case, saw the decree as an unnecessary 
and inappropriate barrier that constrained police and protected drug dealers and other 
wrongdoers from the consequences of their actions.56  After several unsuccessful 
attempts to undo the consent decree, especially in the years after it first went into 
effect,57 the City finally succeeded in 1996 in modifying the procedures.58 NYCHA and 
the City used the Bawdy House Law – adopted in the early 1900s as part of part New 
York's Real Property Actions and Proceedings Laws to fight brothels and other forms 
of vice – to evict  tenants  involved  in  illegal  activity. in cases involving drug 
traffickers.59 The basic argument was the consent decree should be modified due to "the 
dramatic increase in drug trade in public housing" due to a crack epidemic that was 
"unforeseen when the consent agreement was made."60 Together with a spike in drug 
related crimes, NYCHA sought the consent decree's alteration so that it can more easily 
      
53
 Escalera v. New York City Housing Authority, at 863 
 See Franco, , at 1204 n.24. 
54
 See White, at 379. 55
56 See, e.g., Defendant's Motion to Modify the Escalera Decree, Escalera v. New York City Hous. Auth., 
67 Civ. 4307, at 2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 2, 1993) (explaining modification necessary to facilitate eviction of 
those using their apartments for illegal gain, i.e. selling drugs); White, supra note Error! Bookmark not 
defined., at 377-79 (using examples of drug trafficking in public housing as justification for modifying the 
nsent decree). co
 Thompson v NYCHA, Thompson v NYCHA 57
 Escalera v. New York Hous. Auth., 924 F.Supp. 1323 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). 58
59 N.Y.McKinney's RPAPL §§ 711 and 715.  See, Valerie D. White, Note, Modifying the Escalera Consent 
Decree: A Case Study on the Application of the Rufo Test, 23 Fordham Urban Law Journal 377 (1996); 
Bill Alden, Procedure to Evict Drug Dealers Eased, Modification of 1071 Consent Decree Granted.  New 
rk Law Journal, April 22, pg 1. Yo
60 White, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 394. 
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osed 
 mentally disabled granddaughter several blocks away from 
evict residents who create safety risks by dealing drugs out of their apartments.61 The 
federal district court explicitly rested its decision on the heightened safety problem p
by the crack epidemic.62  
 Federal law followed the pattern of Escalera by broadening the use of eviction to 
and creating a framework for prosecutions of public housing residents63. In 1996, 
President Clinton announced the “One Strike” policy to encourage public housing 
authorities to apply the 1988 provisions to speed the eviction of residents involved in 
criminal activity. The Supreme Court sanctioned such evictions in HUD v. Rucker, a 9th 
Circuit case involving the eviction of a 63-year old grandmother and her family – based 
on the drug arrest of her
public housing grounds.64 
 Policing followed suit.  The changes in New York City’s policing strategies in the 
1990s were well-suited to crime and drug problems in public housing.  New York City 
had received millions of dollars in federal drug control funds under the HUD Drug 
Elimination Program (DEP).65 The primary policing program in DEP was Operation Safe 
Home (OSH), which fielded intensive patrols in and around public housing sites. This 
prong of DEP expanded in 1994, coinciding with the advent of Order Maintenance 
                                                        
 White, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 400-01. 61
62 See Escalera v. New York Hous. Auth., 924 F.Supp. 1323, 1333-34 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (stating that the 
"appearance of crack was a quantum leap in the drug problem" that led to a "dramatic increase in the 
amount of crime and violence in the public housing developments throughout the city"). 
63 The federal Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 (Section 5101) strengthened existing public housing lease 
ovisions by including language in the leases to the effect that: “A public housing resident, any member of 
resident’s household, or a guest or other person under the resident’s contro
pr
the 
activity, including drug-related criminal activity, on or near public housing premises . . . and such criminal 
activity shall be cause for termination of tenancy” (HUD, April 1991).  A resident does not need to be 
convicted of criminal activity to be considered in violation of Section 5101.   
64 Dep't of Housing. & Urban Development  v Rucker, 535 U.S. 125,(2002) (holding that the federal Anti-
Drug Abuse Act, 42 U.S.C. §  1437d(l)(6) (1994)
l shall not engage in criminal 
, requires lease terms that give local public housing 
thorities the discretion to terminate the lease of a tenant when a member of the household or a guest 
gaged in drug-related act
au
en
ated activity). In New York, public housing officials have similar d
ivity, regardless of whether tenant knew, or should have known, of the drug-
iscretion to evict tenants following rel
conviction of co-residents on drug charges. See, also, Escalera v. N.Y. Hous. Auth., 924 F. Supp. 1323, 
1343-45 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).  
65 Fagan, Davies and Holland, Drug Control in Public Housing (2007) 
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 Under OMP, police departments “focus on quality of life crimes, 
liminating visible signs of disorder before they spiral into something worse.”70 Trespass 
was a perfect fit. 
bifurcated their operations:  “felony weight” stashes were kept in apartments, while street 
Policing (OMP), a law enforcement strategy that emphasized proactive patrol and 
aggressive use of Terry stops to seize weapons and interdict crimes.66   
 The problemmatics of public housing fit well with the growing influence of new 
models of policing based on Wilson and Kelling’s “broken windows” theory67.  The 
visible social disorder of crime and drugs in public housing and environs was exactly the 
type of crime manifestation that served both the theory and justifying ideology of OMP68. 
Broken Windows is premised on the belief that visible signs of disorder tell potential 




C.  Trespass as Disorder 
 During the cocaine and crack epidemics of the 1980s, police tried to disrupt 
outdoor drug bazaars with retail initiatives such as Operation Pressure Point71  and the 
TNT teams.72  Drug sellers adapted to these efforts by shifting to indoor markets. They 
                                                        
66 See, for example, William Bratton and Peter Knobler, TURNAROUND (1998); Judith A Greene, Zero 
lerance: A Case Study of Police Policies and Practices in New York City, 45 Crime and DelinTo
71 (1999). George Kelling and Catherine Cole, FIXING BROKEN WINDO
quency 
WS (1996); New York State 
ar. 1982 
 A Critique of the Social Influence Conception of 
r Through Disorder:  New York’s 
ew 
Evidence from New York City and a Five-City Social Experiment, 73 U. Chi. L. Rev. 271, 276 (2006). 
1
Attorney General, Stop and Frisk Report, 1999; Jeffrey Fagan and Garth Davies, Street Stops and Broken 
Windows: Terry Race, and Disorder in  New York City, 28 Fordham Urban Law Journal 457 (2000). 
Bernard Harcourt, ILLUSION OF ORDER (2001); Gelman, Fagan and Kiss, J Amer Stat Assn (2007). 
67 Wilson and Kelling, Broken Windows, The Atlantic Monthly, M
68 Bernard Harcourt, Reflecting on the Subject: 
Deterrence, the Broken Windows Theory, and Order-Maintenance Policing New York Style, 97 Mich. L. 
Rev. 291, 292 (1998); see generally George Kelling and Catherine M. Coles, Fixing Broken Windows:  
Restoring Order and Reducing Crime in Our Communities (1996) 
 Harcourt, Refleting on the Subject, supra, at 303. 69
70 Scott Duffield Levy, The Collateral Consequences of Seeking Orde
Narcotics Eviction Program, 43 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 539, 547 (2008) (“[Broken Window’s] solution . . 
. was to focus the attention of law enforcement on low-level crime and disorder in order to eliminate the 
signs of social decay and cut off more serious crime before it started.”). 
71 Lynn Zimmer, Operation Pressure Point; Bruce Johnson  et al, 1990 
72 Michele Sviridoff et al., The Neighborhood Effects of Street-Level Drug Enforcement: Tactical 
Narcotics Teams in New York (1992); Bernard E. Harcourt & Jens Ludwig, Broken Windows:  N
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oors74 to apartment buildings 
that enj
 hallways as thoroughfares and foyers 
create probable 
ause for the arrests, the Trespass Affidavit Program (TAP) was created.  
 
III.  THE PRACTICE AND LEGALITY OF VERTICAL PATROL 
dealers carried only “misdemeanor weights.”73  In fact, in an attempt to avoid arrest, 
some retail level dealers shifted their entire operations ind
oyed heightened Fourth Amendment protection.75   
This bifurcation complicated and challenged drug law enforcement in and around 
large urban apartment buildings.76  Without permission from tenants or building 
managers, or exigent circumstances, the police were unable to enter these buildings, 
arrest the dealers, and confiscate their larger stashes of drugs.  As a result, drug dealers 
were able to shield themselves from felony prosecution and prevent the authorities from 
seizing a large portion of their product each time a low-level (usually outdoor street) 
dealer was arrested.  The open air drug markets had moved indoors and – to the 
frustration of building residents and managers – addicts, street level dealers, and those 
associated with the drug trade began to use building
as gathering places to sell, buy and use drugs.77      
  While the apartment-based retail or even wholesale drug deals may have moved 
out of reach of routine patrols in and around apartment buildings, an adaptation of broken 
windows theory to indoor, apartment-based drug dealing suggested that the arrest of 
persons loitering in the hallways or stairwells could disrupt the indoor retail trade.78  To 





73 Johnson et al., 1990; Richard Curtis, The Improbable Transformation …. , 1998; Barbara Boland, The 
Manhattan Experiment:  Community Prosecution, in Crime and Place:  Plenary Papers of the 1997 
Conference on Criminal Justice Research and Evaluation 51, 52-53 (National Institute of Justice 1998). 
74 Id. at 52.   
75 See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980) (“In terms that apply equally to seizures of property 
and to seizures of persons, the Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house.  
Absent exigent circumstances, that threshold may not reasonably be crossed without a warrant.”); Boland, 
supra note 73, at 53 (“Police officers cannot pursue dealers indoors without court-issues search warrants 
..”). 
76 Boland, at 52-53. 
77 Id. at 56; Johnson et al., supra note _; Curtis, 1998 
78 The Manhattan district attorney’s office agreed, believing that it would be “…a good idea for officers to 







Conceptually, TAP is designed to permit the NYPD to act as both landlord and 
police.  It works this way:  First, the NYPD administration reaches out to building owners 
across the city and encourages them to enroll their buildings in the TAP program.79  
Then, the landlords post signs indicating their participation in the program and notifying 
the public that trespassing is forbidden within the building.  They simultaneously supply 
the NYPD with an up-to-date tenant list, and grant permission for police officers to enter 
the premises in order to identify and remove trespassers.80  Once a building is enrolled, 
police officers have the legal authority to enter at will, act as complainant on the owner’s 
behalf, and arrest individuals for the crime of trespass.81  More than any other policing 
development, including the saturation of citizen surveillance thro
sk tactics,82 it is the TAP program that has allowed enforcement of the drug laws 
to pursue drug dealers in apartment dwellings in New York City.   
Around the same time TAP was created, the New York legislature passed a law 
criminalizing trespass in public housing buildings83 and the New York City Housing 
Authority (NYCHA) granted the NYPD permission to enter public housing complexes in 
order to arrest trespassers.84  This effectively expanded TAP to public housing. This step 
was  necessary  because  historically, New York City Housing Authority (NYCHA) 
buildings were considered public property, and thus beyond the reach of the state’s 
criminal trespass statutes.85  This made it difficult for police to “effectively 
blem of “non-residents who enter[ed] the lobbies of public housing apartment 
buildings and threaten[ed] the safety and security of the residents therein.”86   
 
79 See Boland, at 57 
80 Id. 
81 N.Y. City Council, Committee on Public Safety and Subcommittee on Public Housing, Meeting Minutes 
-24 (April 29, 2004) [hereinafter Meeting Minutes]. 23
82 New York State Attorney General, An Investigation of SQF (1999); Harcourt,; Jeffrey Fagan and Garth 
Davies, XXX; Sarah Waldeck, XXX; Jeffrey Fagan et al., Street Stops and Broken Windows Revisited, in 
White and Rice (eds.), ___ (2010). 
83 See N.Y.P.L. § 140.10(e) (2001). 
84
85 People v. Carter, 645 N.Y.S.2d 725, 728 (Crim. Ct. 1996); see also People v. Leonard, 465 N.E.2d 831, 
834 (N.Y. 1984) (“When the property is ‘open to the public’ at the time of the alleged trespass, however, 
 accused is presumed to have a license and privilege to be present.”). 
 Id. at 23.  
the
86 People v. Carter, 645 N.Y.S.2d 725, 728 (Crim. Ct. 1996). 
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reof . . . .”87  The elements of this new form of 
trespas
es, and many independently owned apartments in the 
surrounding area.89  As we show below, TAP departs radically from traditional models of 
retail, street-level drug enfo trategies that use proactive 
policin
unbridled police discretion an
The new statute expanded the trespass prohibition to include individuals who 
“knowingly enter or remain unlawfully in a building or upon real property . . . (e) where 
the building is used as a public housing project in violation of conspicuously posted rules 
or regulations governing entry and use the
sing are straightforward.  The suspect must have (1) unlawfully entered into or 
remained inside of (2) a public housing building (3) in violation of conspicuously posted 
signs governing the use of the building.   
Currently, TAP extends to over 3,200 buildings city wide,88 including all 330 
NHYCHA public housing complex
rcement, and fits well with other s
g to reduce social control.   
 
A.  Trespass as the New Loitering 
The enforcement of New York’s public housing trespass ban90 bears a striking 
resemblance to the vague and overbroad loitering, vagrancy, and disorderly conduct laws 
used to isolate and control the movement of non-whites during the mid-1900s.91  Those 
statutes enabled “the police [to] seize just about anyone on the street” because they could 
be “applied to almost any public behavior.”92  As a result, a dangerous confluence of 
d widespread racism developed, eventually leading to the 
                                                        
87 N.Y. Penal Law § 140.10(e) (McKinney 2001).  Violation of this statute is a class B misdemeanor, 
ble at 
permission to enter these buildings and inquire of 
re.”). 
wer to complain:  ‘undesirables’ of various sorts, and especially minorities, the poor, and the 
m J. Stuntz, Privacy’s Problem and the Law of Criminal Procedure, 93 Mich. L. Rev. 1016, 1076 
punishable by a fixed term in prison of up to three months.  Id. § 70.15 
88 New York County District Attorney’s Office, Trespass Affidavit Program, availa
http://manhattanda.org/communityaffairs/commaffunit/crime/tres_prog.shtml (on file with author). 
89 See Boland, supra note at 57 (“Community Affairs now routinely works with community policing 
officers and landlords to enroll problem buildings . . . .”); Meeting Minutes, supra, at 23 (“The New York 
City Housing Authority has given the Police Department 
those they encounter the reasons for them being the
90 N.Y. Penal Law § 140.10(e) (McKinney 2001). 
91 See Debra Livingston, Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in Public Places:  Courts, Communities, 
and the New Policing, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 551, 596 (1997) (“This regime was politically acceptable for an 
extended period because the police, in the main, did not arrest just anyone.  Instead, they used their 








hose not lawfully 
resent in the building are arrested.100  As a result, the movement of public housing 
sidents, their guests, and tho he building – a group almost 
xclusively comprised of people of color  -- is severely constrained.  
 
                                                       
invalidation of many of these statutes.93  However, as Lawrence Rosenthal points out, 
even some of the conventional, modern criminal statutes “allow… the police enormous 
freedom to undertake a variety of quite heavy-handed measures against the residents of 
inner-city minority communities.”94  Some statutes, like a Ch
ce, were struck down by the courts and subsequently revised to cabin police 
discretion in reacting to the inherent inchoateness of loitering.95  Others, like the public-
housing specific trespass law in New York, remain on the books.96   
Like those statutes struck down for permitting the police nearly unfettered 
discretion to stop and arrest those they encounter, the New York trespass statute permits 
police officers patrolling public housing to stop---and often arrest---nearly everyone they 
encounter.97  Currently, New York courts seem to permit police officers to question any 
individual found in the common areas of public housing buildings, whether or not the 
police have a founded suspicion that criminal activity that criminal activity is afoot.98  
During that questioning, police inquire into the suspect’s residency.99  T
p
re se simply present in t
101e
 
B.  The Tactical Model 
 
93 Id at 1077 
94 Lawrence Rosenthal, Gang Loitering and Race, 91 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 99, 152 (2000). 
95 Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999). 
96 N.Y. Penal Law § 140.10(e) (McKinney 2001). 
97 See, e.g., People v. Anderson, 759 N.Y.S.2d 676, 676 (App. Div. 2003); People v. Babarich, 561 
N.Y.S.2d 255, 256 (App. Div. 1990); People v. Tinort, 709 N.Y.S.2d 511, 512 (App. Div. 2000) (justifying 
stop on finding that building was high crime area with which police officer was sufficiently familiar to 
inquire into Tinort’s reason for being there); People v. Carter, 645 N.Y.S.2d 725, 728 (Crim. Ct. 1996) 
(“Thus, simply being in the lobby of a housing project can subject someone to a criminal trespass 
violation.”).   
98 Adam Carlis, The Illegality of Vertical Patrols, 109 Colum. L. Rev. (2009). 
99 See People v. Hendricks, 841 N.Y.S.2d 94, 95 (App. Div. 2007) (“It is standard practice for officers, 
upon encountering an individual in such an area, to inquire whether the individual lives in the building . . . 
and to ask for identification to determine if the individual is trespassing”). 
100 See, e.g., People v. Tinort, 709 N.Y.S.2d 511, 512 (App. Div. 2000) (detailing arrest of non-resident 
unable to justify his presence in the building. 
101 New York City Housing Authority, Comprehensive Annual Financial Report for the Year Ended 
December 31, 2008, at 104 (2009) (reporting that only 4.3% of New York’s public housing residents are 
white). 
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spassers.   Once 
a build
 
.   The 
second
arrests while on vertical patrol.  Without the expanded trespass statute, this initial 
                                                       
 
TAP is designed to permit the New York Police Department (NYPD) to act as 
both landlord and police.  It works as follows.  First, the NYPD reaches out to building 
owners across the city and encourages them to enroll their buildings in the TAP 
program.102  Then, the landlords post signs indicating their participation in the program 
and notifying the public that trespassing is forbidden within the building.  They 
simultaneously supply the NYPD with an up-to-date tenant list, and grant permission for 
police officers to enter the premises in order to identify and remove tre 103
ing is enrolled, police officers have the legal authority to enter at will, act as 
complainant on the owner’s behalf, and arrest individuals for the crime of trespass.104  
More than any other policing development, it is the TAP program that has allowed 
enforcement of the drug laws to follow the dealers into the buildings.   
The police tactic most frequently associated with TAP is the vertical patrol.105  
These patrols serve two basic functions.  The first is related to building safety.  During a 
vertical patrol, officers systematically move through the building looking for hazards 
such as malfunctioning elevators, broken handrails, and poorly lit hallways 106
 function is related to security.  When the officers enter the building, they travel to 
the roof and work their way down, floor by floor, questioning individuals they 
encounter107 in order to determine whether they are a resident or invited guest.108  
Individuals not authorized to be present in the building are subject to arrest.109   
The amended trespass statute is the main tool of police offers seeking to make 
 
102 See Boland, at 57 
103 Id. 
104 N.Y. City Council, Committee on Public Safety and Subcommittee on Public Housing, Meeting 
Minutes 23--24 (April 29, 2004) [hereinafter Meeting Minutes]. 
105 New York City Police Department Patrol Guide §§ 212-59, 212-60 (2005).     
106 Id. 
107 See, e.g., People v. Roque, 99 N.Y.2d 50, 52 (2002) (“Police . . . stop people they encounter . . . to ask 
for identification and to inquire if they are . . . lawfully in the building.”); People v. Powell, 691 N.Y.S.2d 
263, 265 (Sup. Ct. 1999) (“[T]he officers stop all who are found, question them as to why they are in the 
building or on the grounds, and ask for identification showing they live in the building or for an apartment 
number to verify a legitimate visit.”). 
108 Meeting Minutes, supra at 23. 
109 See People v. Roque, 780 N.E.2d 976, 977 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002) (“The purpose of vertical sweeps, or 




 stop and frisk law, a police officer need only have 
“some 
evidence that they are a lawfully present guest, that alone is sufficient to justify their 
questioning would pose almost no threat of arrest:  before 1992, non-residents were 
permitted to occupy the public areas of these buildings.  Under the new statute, howeve
idents unable to identify a resident with whom they were visiting are subject to 
arrest.110   This is because arrests are justified if the officer has probable cause to believe 
that the suspect either entered into, or remained inside of, the building unlawfully.111   
Even during the most routine vertical patrol stop, police officers can quickly 
develop probable cause for a trespass arrest.  Under People v. De Bour, the leading New 
York Court of Appeals case on state
articulable reason”112 to ask “basic, nonthreatening questions.”113  This low bar 
prevents only those inquiries “undertaken with intent to harass or . . . based upon mere 
whim, caprice or idle curiosity.”114   
Historically, New York courts have considered inquiries “regarding . . . identity, 
address or destination” to be background information, for which the police officer need 
only some articulable suspicion.115  And, given the permissible standard for what 
constitutes articulable suspicion, courts have upheld inquiries into a suspect’s place of 
residency on littler more than their mere presence in the building.116  As a result, current 
New York jurisprudence places almost no barriers between the police officer and the 
arrest of a non-resident unlawfully present in public housing.  Once the initial inquiry 
begins, a non-resident will quickly have to divulge their non-residency and, absent some 
                                                        
110 People v. Tinort, 709 N.Y.S.2d 511, 512 (App. Div. 2000) (upholding a non-resident’s conviction after 
he “claimed to have been visiting a friend, but claimed not to know the friend’s name, and supplied an 
apartment number known by the officer to be non-existent.”); People v. Carter, 645 N.Y.S.2d 725, 728 
ul presence in public housing). 
g suspect’s claim that policy inquiry into his residency status 
ion when suspect was part 
lding lobby).  
(Crim. Ct. 1996) (permitting arrest of nonresident for unlawf
111 People v. De Bour, 352 N.E.2d 562, 572 (N.Y. 1976). 
112 People v. De Bour, 352 N.E.2d 562, 565 (N.Y. 1976). 
113 People v. Hollman, 590 N.E.2d 204, 206 (N.Y. 1992). 
114 People v. De Bour, 352 N.E.2d 562, 567 (N.Y. 1976). 
115 People v. Hollman, 590 N.E.2d 204, 206 (N.Y. 1992); see also People v. McIntosh, 755 N.E.2d 329, 
331 (N.Y. 2001) (asserting that “it is well settled” that, before an officer “asks an individual to provide 
identification,” the officer need only an articulable reason for the inquiry); People v. Anderson, 759 
N.Y.S.2d 676, 676 (App. Div. 2003) (rejectin
required more than an articulable suspicion). 
116 See People v. Hendricks, 841 N.Y.S.2d 94, 96 (App. Div. 2007) (justifying initial stop because 
Hendricks “appeared to be staying in the [building’s] vestibule” with no intention to leave or enter); People 
v. Anderson, 759 N.Y.S.2d 676, 676 (App. Div. 2003) (finding articulable suspic
of group of “nine or ten persons” moving from second floor to bui
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re individuals can mingle.  Those who try are frequently confronted by the 
pol
s magnified.  
Not on
taking place.  Instead, police officers on vertical patrol can rely on the public housing 
                                                       
arrest.117  The result is that the common areas of public housing buildings are no longer 
spaces we
ice and, if they are unable to justify their presence, they are often hauled away to 
jail.118     
While the large number of vertical patrols may make the tactic appear routine,119  
they are, in fact, rife with danger for both officers and residents.  For officers, traversing 
these building late at night, especially when encountering suspects on the roof, or in other 
off-limits areas, adds a great deal of uncertainty.  As the New York Times points out, 
“[T]he rooftops of the housing project can be perilous.  They provide a convenient escape 
route for criminals who like to conduct business---robberies, assaults and drug deals---on 
the darkened top-floor landings of the stairwells.”120  As a result, officers often conduct 
this part of the patrol with their guns drawn.121  For residents, the danger i
ly must they we wary of criminals, but, sadly, of the police as well:  Recent years 
of seen to unarmed residents shot and killed by police on vertical patrol.122   
Nevertheless, vertical patrols continue because they are presented as an effective 
crime fighting strategy.123  Targeting trespass, rather than funneling resources toward 
direct enforcement of the drug laws, provides the police with a tactical benefit.  To make 
an arrest pursuant to a trespass stop, probable cause is required.124  As a result, targeting 
street-level dealers usually involves undercover buy-and-bust operations, an expensive, 
dangerous, and time-consuming tactic.  On the other hand, targeting trespass violations in 
TAP buildings eliminates the need for police officers to actually witness a drug-crime 
 
le v. Tinort, 709 N.Y.S.2d 511, 512 (App. Div. 2000). 117 Peop
118 M. Chris Fabricant, Rousting the Cops, Village Voice, October 30, 2007, 
http://www.villagevoice.com/2007-10-30/news/rousting-the-cops/  
119 In New York City there were approximately 396,000 conducted in 2003 alone,See Meeting Minutes, at 
26. 156,000 of which took place in public housing buildings. 
120 A Wrongful Death in Brooklyn, N.Y. Times, Jan. 27, 2004, at A22. 
121 Id.; see also Meeting Minutes, at 31. 
122 See, e.g., Bennett Capers, Crime, Legitimacy, and Testilying, 83 Ind. L.J. 835, 847 (2008) (discussing 
the killing of Timothy Stansbury Jr. by police officer on vertical patrol); see also N.Y. Lawyers for the Pub. 
Interest, No Place Like Home:  A Preliminary Report on Police Interactions with Public Housing Residents 
in New York City 6 (2008) (detailing shooting death of Nicholas Heyward by police officers on vertical 
patrol in Brooklyn’s Gowanus Houses).   
123 See Meeting Minutes, at 25. 
124 People v. De Bour, 352 N.E.2d 562, 572 (N.Y. 1976). 
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tematic stops do sometimes lead to the arrest of individuals 
for drug-related activity.126    
 
mands a close scrutiny of vertical patrols before they 
should 
stops violate New York state l
                                                 
specific trespass law, and the suspect’s presence in the building, to make their initial 
approach.125  They therefore are able to question more people with less evidence.  And, 
while overinclusive, these sys
C.  Vertical Patrol and the Fourth Amendment 
Despite the concerns of residents, and academics, neither TAP, nor vertical 
patrols, have been directly challenged in the courts.127  Instead, state courts have treated 
trespass arrests as individual occurrences,128 determining their legality based on the 
familiar De Bour standard for searches and seizures, rather than assessing the legality of 
the tactic itself.129  Nevertheless, the systematic stops and resulting trespass arrests 
inherent in TAP raise potential state law and Fourth Amendment claims related to 
suspicionless searches.  Furthermore, because of the nature of public housing and urban 
poverty, vertical patrols have a dramatic disparate impact on people of color.  This effect 
problematizes the tactic and de
be allowed to continue.   
Courts have not spoken as to whether vertical patrols and the resulting systematic 
aw protections against unreasonable searches and seizures.  
        
125 Because New York common law requires “articulable suspicion” before an officer approaches a 
suspect, id. at 563, police officers generally attempt to justify these stops on presence in public housing 
plus some additional factor.  See, e.g., People v. Anderson, 759 N.Y.S.2d 676, 676 (App. Div. 2003) 
(finding articulable suspicion when suspect was part of group of “nine or ten persons” moving from second 
floor to building lobby); People v. Tinort, 709 N.Y.S.2d 511, 512 (App. Div. 2000) (justifying stop on 
finding that building was high crime area with which police officer was sufficiently familiar to inquire into 
Tinort’s reason for being there); People v. Taylor, No. 54639C-2005, 2006 WL 1348745, at *3 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. May 12, 2006) (finding no objective credible reason to approach suspect who was merely exiting public 
housing building); People v. Carter, 645 N.Y.S.2d 725, 726 (Crim. Ct. 1996) (finding suspect’s nervous 
demeanor and smell of marijuana created articulable reason for initial inquiry). 
126 See, e.g., People v. Hendricks, 43 A.D.3d 361, 363 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007) (2007) (detailing an arrest 
made while on vertical patrol that led to the confiscation of $794, a box cutter, and thirty-two baggies of 
cocaine); People v. Quinones, No. 2006 NY 010937, 2007 WL 764714, at *1-2 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2007) 
(detailing confiscation of cocaine by officer on vertical patrol). 
127 Carlis, Vertical Patrols 
128 See, e.g., People v. Crawford, 719 N.Y.S.2d 18, 19 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001) (failing to question the 
legality of TAP and finding officer had “an objective credible reason” to approach suspect); People v. 
Thompson, 686 A.D.2d 242, 243 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999) (failing to assess legality of vertical patrols when 
upholding a conviction for drug possession); People v. Plower, 574 N.Y.S.2d 337, 338 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1991) (same). 
129 See generally People v. De Bour, 352 N.E.2d 562 (1976) (articulating the standard for search and 
seizure under New York common law). 
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ce in a public housing building, something the New York courts are unlikely 
to do.13
they almost certainly violate the Supreme Court’s ruling in City of Indianapolis v. 
                                                       
Under New York law, police need an “articulable reason” to justify approaching a 
suspect for the purpose of requesting background information.130  To ask “more pointed” 
questions indicating that the suspect is under suspicion of violating the law requires a 
“founded suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.”131  Vertical patrols targeting 
trespassers may violate these requirements because the stops are systematic and therefore 
are often conducted without reliance on facts particular to the suspect being questioned.  
For the practice to be sustained, a court would have to permit systematic stops based on 
mere presen
2    
A challenge to vertical patrols asserting that asserted Fourth Amendment 
violations might also be successful.  While high crime area doctrine permits police 
officers to take location into account when determining whether they have sufficient 
justification to stop and question a suspect,133 the systematic nature of the stops 
associated with vertical patrols may fall below even this low threshold.  This is because 
location alone does not provide the reasonable suspicion necessary for an investigatory 
stop.134  Similarly, if it can be shown that the stops taking place during vertical patrols 
rise to the level of systematic seizures, a question beyond the scope of this paper, then 
 
130 Id. at 378.  
131 
132  See, BARRY KAMINS NEW YORK SEARCH & SEIZURE § 2.04 (Matthew Bender, Rev. Ed. 2009) (citing 
People v. Holmes 619 N.E.2d 396 (N.Y. 1993) (“In New York, . . . an officer who merely observes an 
individual in a high crime area would, at most, have the right to approach and request basic information. 
Should the individual flee, this would not elevate the encounter to reasonable suspicion, and, therefore, the 
officer would not be permitted to pursue the suspect.”)  In People v. Holmes, the New York Court of 
Appeals held that police officers who observed a suspect with a bulge in his jacket pocket standing with 
other men in a known narcotics location did not have reasonable suspicion to pursue the suspect when he 
fled.  Holmes, 619 N.E.2d at 397 (“Flight alone . . .  or even in conjunction with equivocal circumstances 
that might justify a police request for information is insufficient to justify pursuit because an individual has 
a right ‘to be let alone’ and refuse to respond to police inquiry” (citations omitted)).  Even in a high crime 
area flight must be combined with some other more particularized indication of criminality to give rise to 
reasonable suspicion. See, e.g., People v. Martinez, 606 N.E.2d 951, 953 (N.Y. 1992) (holding that flight 
when the officers approached, presence in a narcotics prone neighborhood, and possession of a special 
device known to be used for hiding drugs gave rise to reasonable suspicion). 
Id. at 385. 
133 Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000); Andrew Guthrie Ferguson & Damien Bernache, The 
“High-Crime Area” Question:  Requiring Verifiable and Quantifiable Evidence for Fourth Amendment 
Reasonable Suspicion Analysis, 57 Am. U. L. Rev. 1587, 1589 (2008). 
134 See, e.g., United States v. See, 574 F.3d 309, 313--14 (6th Cir. 2009) (finding unconstitutional stop that 
took place in high crime area because police lacked sufficient additional factors to create reasonable 
suspicion). 
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common areas of public ho
                                                       
Edmond, which struck down a narcotics roadblock because it constituted systematic, 
suspicionless seizures for the purpose of general crime control.135   
 
D. Trespass and Equal Protection 
The demography of public housing makes racial disparity in the tactic’s 
implementation inevitable, regardless of legal or policy justifications. Nevertheless, 
residents of public housing, as a group, hardly qualify as a protected class under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  But that fact alone should not end the discussion.  One could 
argue that vertical patrols do not target residents of public housing as a class, but rather 
are specifically targeted at residents of color.  
Public housing in New York is dramatically segregated.  In 2008, 91% of public 
housing residents were African-American or Latino, and only 4.3% were white.136  When 
it comes to those residents most affected by vertical patrols and trespass stops, these 
numbers are even more dramatic.  The white population contains a disproportionately 
high number of individuals over the age of 62.137  Senior citizens would seem both less 
likely to be targeted during a vertical patrol and less likely to be in the common areas of 
the building for an extended period of time.  And, white residents are not uniformly 
distributed across all NYCHA buildings.  Instead, they tend to be clustered in the more 
desirable buildings.138  Because vertical patrols are also not conducted uniformly across 
all NYCHA buildings, but rather targeted to those buildings where the police believe they 
will be most effective,139 it is likely that many white residents escape the brunt of vertical 
patrol activity.   
  The tactic itself, which consists of systematic stops of anyone found in the 
using, continues in part because of a racially-charged 
 
135 Systematic, suspicionless seizures executed for the general purpose of crime control violate the Fourth 
endment.  City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 34, 36 (2000) Am
136 New York City Housing Authority, Comprehensive Annual Financial Report for the Year Ended 
ember 31, 2008, at 104 (2009). Dec
 Id. 137
138 See generally Davis v. New York City Housing Authority, 166 F.3d 432 (1999) (reversing lower court’s 
injunction against implementation of a presidential preference policy that would have had disproportionate 
negative effects on minority applicants in the twenty-one NYCHA developments that were more than 30% 
te, including eleven that were more than 50% white). whi
139 New York City Police Department Patrol Guide §§ 212-59, 212-60 (2005).     
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crime control may void a claim
                                                 
perception of public housing.  Vertical patrols, and the trespass arrests that accompany 
them, borrow heavily from theories of order maintenance that focus on visible signs of 
disorder.140  But, similar to high crime area doctrine, the metrics for moving from 
perception of disorder to categorization of a place as disorderly are subjective and 
relativistic.  Sociologists and social psychologists have shown that perceptions of 
disorder are influenced by the racial make-up of the community being observed, but also 
by characteristics of the observer. 141  A body of good social science shows that 
“Americans hold persistent beliefs linking blacks and disadvantaged minority groups to 
many social images, including but not limited to crime, violence, disorder, welfare, and 
undesirability as neighbors.”142  As a result, when viewing public housing, police and 
politicians may be prone to attributions of a higher level of disorder simply because the 
majority of residents are people of color.143  
 Of course, an Equal Protection claim here would require direct proof that the 
implementation of TAP in public housing was race-dependent and purposeful. Since 
public housing is predominantly non-white, showing that race was a motivating factor in 
trespass enforcement would require a complex analysis of relevant non-racial factors that 
are associated with the conditions of crime and disorder that would lead police to conduct 
sweeps in public housing.  The police could argue, perhaps persuasively, that the higher 
crime rates in public housing motivated the higher rate of sweeps.  Or perhaps it is the 
verticality of public housing that lends itself to programs such as Operation Clean 
Hallways, a factor that is correlated with race.  Certainly, case law creates a high barrier 
to a claim here of intentional discrimination.144 Even if the inferences by police about 
race and crime rates of public housing residents were made plain, the state’s interest in 
 of intentional discrimination based on race. 
        
140
141 Robert J. Sampson & Stephen W. Raudenbush, Seeing Disorder:  Neighborhood Stigma and the Social 
struction of “Broken Windows,” 67 Soc. Psychol. Q. 319, 320 (2004). 
 Skogan, Livingston, Harcourt, Taylor, Waldeck 
Con
 Id. 142
143 Id. at 330 (““[C]oncentrated poverty, proportion black, and proportion Latino are related positively and 
significantly to perceived disorder.”); see also Lincoln Quillian & Devah Pager, Black Neighbors, Higher 
Crime?  The Role of Racial Stereotypes in Evaluations of Neighborhood Crime, 107 Am. J. Soc. 717, 749 
(2001) (“[O]ur results suggest that whites (and Latinos) systematically overestimate the extent to which 
percentage black and neighborhood crime rates are associated; this association persists even when official 
e rates are controlled.”). crim





 In this case, an equal protection claim would have to squarely face the question of 
crime and disorder that are the rationale for the allocation of vertical patrols. If trespass 
enforcement is indexed to crime, we should observe variation from one place to the next 
that is predicted by its crime rate, net of other non-racial factors that are correlated with 
crime.  In this case, the search for drugs and weapons are the two compelling policy 
justifications articulated by the NYPD,145 and indexing trespass enforcement to rates of 
drugs or other crime in public housing would provide a benchmark on which to assess the 
distribution of police enforcement and the attendant burdens of police suspicion and 
interdiction.   
 This is the test we conduct to determine if, in fact, the targeting of public housing 
in New York for trespass enforcement masks an underlying racial targeting, or excess of 
enforcement that cannot be explained by crime rates alone.  We consider two faces of 
trespass enforcement under TAP: trespass stops, pursuant to the ongoing tactics of Stop, 
Question and Frisk,146 and trespass arrests.  The former bypass the DeBour Level 1 right 
of common-law inquiry and proceed directly to Level 3 -- probable cause leading to 
arrest.147  The former bypass Level 1 and proceed directly to Level 2. We enhance the 
test by simulating an experiment that controls for one-off similarities of public housing 
with its immediate environs, and testing to see if the excess in enforcement above and 







 Bratton and Knobler, 1998; Spitzer, 1999; Maple and Mitchell, 2000; Fagan et al., 2010 
146
147 People v. DeBour, 40 N.Y. 2d 210 (1976). While Terry assumes that police-civilian encounters, even 
suspicionless ones, are consensual and could be terminated by the suspect, People v DeBour forbids 
inquiries “based on mere whim, caprice, or idle curiosity”.  See, Adam Carlis, Vertical Patrols. 
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals set forth a four-tiered scheme in which invasive police actions, ranging 
from accusatory questions to frisks and searches, must be justified by progressively elevated levels of 
suspicion. At Level 1, officers can stop a citizen based on an objective credible reason to approach to 
request information.  At Level 2, officers must have founded suspicion.  Level 3 is requires “reasonable 
suspicion” to engage the citizen and (if there is reason to fear that the suspect has weapons or the officer is 
in danger, to frisk.  Level 4 is a probable cause arrest and full search incident to the arrest.  See, Patrick J. 
McCloskey, Street Encounters Made Simple, 
http://nassau18b.org/search_seizure/Street%20Encounters%20Made%20Simple.pdf   
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non-fingerprintable offenses.  
                                                 




1. Stops, Crimes and Arrests 
 
Counts and locations trespass stops and arrests and other crime conditions were 
obtained from databases maintained by the NYPD.   
The NYPD records information on a form known as the UF-250 each time a 
citizen is stopped by the police, according to procedures set forth in the NYPD Patrol 
Guide (2009), and updated following the consent decree in Daniels v City of New York 
(2003). These records have been maintained in a digital database since 1998, when the 
state Attorney General began his investigation of the department’s Stop and Frisk tactics 
(Spitzer, 1999). Records of stops from 2003-8 were made publicly available by the New 
York City Police Department following a Freedom of Information Law (FOIL) request 
and subsequent court order (NYCLU, 2008).148  Due to inconsistencies between the first 
year in the panel and later years, we use data from 2004-8.  
The UF-250 form requires officers to record information regarding the suspect’s 
demographic and physical characteristics, the location and time of day of the stop, the 
suspect’s address, and information about the officer who made the stop and the 
supervisor who reviewed it.  The form contains a free-response section where officers 
indicate the suspected offense that generated the stop.  While officers may use any 
number of phrases to describe stops based on suspicion of trespass possession, we use a 
few key and recurring terms to identify these “trespass” stops.149  We use similar 
procedures to identify stops for suspicion of carrying a concealed weapon (e.g., 
“CPW”150), a primary focus of OMP policing (Spitzer, 1999; Fagan et al., 2010), and 
other suspected crimes, including “index crimes”, other felonies and misdemeanors and 
The UF-250 also includes information on the demographic 
        
148 New York Civil Liberties Union v. New York City Police Department, 2008 WL 2522233 (N.Y. Sup. 
 May 7, 2008). Ct.,
149 Stops are identified as trespass stops from the “crimsusp” (i.e., “crime suspected”) field.  A 30-
character string, crimsusp is entered by the officers at the time of a stop, and can take on virtually any 
value, including typographical errors. Variations on the spelling of the word trespass, or variations in the 
designation of the trespass statute under NYPL §140.05, 140.10, 140.15, 140.17, were recoded as trespass 
s or abbreviations with the obvious connotation of trespass  stop




and physical characteristics of the persons stopped and the legal basis for the stop.151  
While records of stop locations in some years in the panel were geocoded to x-y 
(latitude, longitude) coordinates by the NYPD, other years included only a text string 
stating the stop location.  Those records were geocoded using spatial software to locate 
their x-y coordinates based on the address recorded.152  Using boundary maps provided 
by the New York City Department of City Planning, we located each stop either to a 
public housing site, its immediately surrounding area, or elsewhere in the police precinct 
or borough.  The surrounding area was determined by identifying the census block groups 
that surrounded the public housing site.  Figure 1 illustrates one of these spatial clusters.  
Trespass arrests were recorded in a similar fashion.  Records of each arrest were 
obtained by one of the authors from the NYPD pursuant to litigation in Floyd et al. v. 
City of New York153.  These records identify the suspect race and alleged offense, as well 
as the location of the arrest and the crime.  Geocoding procedures identical to those used 
for stops were used to locate the arrests to a geographic space.  
Data on reported crimes also were obtained from the NYPD as part of the Floyd 
litigation.  Similar geocoding procedures were used to locate crimes.  Each crime record 
included one of 113 crime codes supplied by the NYPD, and were collapsed into a 
smaller set of homogeneous categories that correspond to the crime types in the federal 
crime reporting system.154 Crime complaints were aggregated for each month within each 
category for each of the three spatial divisions.  They are measured by thousands, though 
substantive results are robust to a control for logged crime complaints. 
        
151 Both federal (Terry v Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)) and New York State caselaw (People v DeBour, 40 
N.Y. 2d 210 (1976)) require articulable and individualized suspicion for a stop.  See, Patrick J. McCloskey, 
Street Encounters Made Simple, supra.  The legal bases for stops are stated on the UF-250 form, and 
officer check off the relevant reasons.  See, Amanda Geller and Jeffrey Fagan, Pot as Pretext: Marijuana, 
e and the New Disorder in New York City Street Policing.  CELS 2009, on SSRN. Rac
152 ArcView GIS 9.3 (http://www.esri.com/software/arcgis/arcview/index.html).  Unintelligible records 
were omitted from this analysis, though they were assigned to precincts and boroughs based on the 




153 David Floyd, et al. v. City of New York, et al., U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York, No. 
iv. 1034 (S.D.N.Y.) 08 C
154 U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Reports, 
http://www.fbi.gov/filelink.html?file=ucr/handbook/ucrhandbook04.pdf. For example, “violent crime” 
complaints refer to homicide, manslaughter, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, arson, and kidnapping. 
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2.  Social and Economic Conditions 
 
 Data on social and economic conditions were recorded separately for public 
housing sites and the areas adjacent neighborhoods.  Table 1 shows descriptive statistics 
for the two sets of areas.  
 The population characteristics of public housing sites were drawn from the 
NYCHA Resident Data Handbooks, for 2005-2008.155  These records are based on 
annual tenant surveys that NYCHA conducts as part of its residency certification process. 
Of course, tenants have incentives to underreport occupancy, and to perhaps discount 
income totals and other economic indicators.  The critical measures for this analysis are 
age and race.  Non-reporting of unrelated adults in the household is far more likely than 
withholding information on unrelated children.  Accordingly, population estimates and 
age distributions may have errors whose parameters are difficult to estimate.  We doubt 
that there is distortion by race, given the very low rates of mixed race households in the 
survey data.  There is no ex ante reason to assume that non-reported adults or children 
would be from different racial or ethnic groups than the official residents.  From the 
tenant survey data, we extracted measures of racial composition, percent minors (below 
18), household size, per capita income, and total population.  These were aggregated for 
each project site.   
 For the surrounding areas, the same measures were obtained from 2006 tract-level 
projections of U.S. Census data, (see ESRI, 2006 for details.) 
 The core comparison is the difference in the rates of trespass stops and arrests in 
public housing versus the immediate surrounding area, adjusted for any differences in the 
crime and socioeconomic conditions between the two areas.  However, four of the 
covariates were highly correlated with the dummy indicator for public housing. This 
result was hardly surprising, since public housing is not randomly distributed throughout 
the city. Figure 2 shows that public housing is highly concentrated in economically 
disadvantaged and racially segregated areas.  We considered, even attempted, to construct 
propensity scores for these conditions to simulate experimental conditions for the 
        
155 The 2004 data were unavailable, so 2005 values were substituted for 2004. This presents little problem 
as the numbers are very stable across years. 
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comparison.156  But we observed the same problem of multicollinearity, and as a result 
there was no variation in the computed propensity score. To reduce multicollinearity and 
identify a parameter to reflect the ecological differences between the two spatial units, we 
reduced the four variables to a single factor using simple principal components analysis 
(PCA).157 The resulting factor score was included as a covariate in the estimates, together 
with population (logged) and crime conditions (lagged).  
 We also control for the number of tall multi-residence buildings in the 
surrounding areas.158  Population density was one consideration in introducing this 
control, as was the built environment in the surrounding areas.  Because of the design of 
TAP, we anticipated that there would also be vertical patrols in buildings of similar 
physical design and size in the surrounding areas. Accordingly, we control for the 
number of residential buildings that are six (6) stories or higher in the surrounding area. 
 The data on building size and location are from the New York City Lot Info files 
(2000).159  The files are organized by tax lots, and lots were aggregated to the block 
group level to fit into boundaries shown (illustratively) in Figure 1.  In most instances, 
each lot has one building, so the computation is largely straightforward. However, in a 
small number of cases, a lot has more than one building.  In these cases, the number of 
buildings was divided into the total number of floors to produce an averaged measure. As 
a validity check, all models were specified with an alternate version of this variable, 
where all of the lots with multiple buildings were removed from consideration. The 
dentical results in all cases. 
         
156 See, e.g., Donald B. Rubin, Estimating Causal Effects from Large Data Sets Using Propensity Scores, 
127 
ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 757 (1997). See, also, Heejung Bang and James M. Robins, Doubly Robust 
Estimation in Missing Data and Causal Inference Models. 61 BIOMETRICS 962 (2005); A. Indurkhya, N. 
Mitra, and Deborah Schrag, Using Propensity Scores to Estimate the Cost-Effectiveness of Medical 
Therapies, 25 STATISTICS IN MEDICINE 1561 (2006).  For a thoughtful discussion, see David A. 
Freedman and Richard A. Berk, Weighting Regressions by Propensity Scores, 32 EVALUATION REVIEW 392 
08). (20
 The eigenvalue of the single factor was 2.53, and the explained variance was 63.3%. 157
158 TAP focused on tall residential apartment buildings throughout the City, but was concentrated in the 
City’s poorer neighborhoods where building managers and tenant groups requested the City’s support to 
control illegal entries onto and into their premises.  Accordingly, the NYPD entered into agreements not 
only with NYCHA to conduct vertical patrols in its project sites, but also to private buildings and multi-unit 
residential buildings that were administered by other state and federal housing programs.  Neither the 
PD nor the city’s housing agencies made a list of such buildings available. NY




B.  Model Specification 
 The analysis proceeds in three stages.  First, we use random effects negative 
binominal regressions, with a dummy variable for public housing, to estimate differences 
in trespass stop and arrest rates in public housing versus surrounding areas.  The 
dependent variables are counts of each event.  We prefer negative binomials to poisson 
models to avoid the assumptions of independence of these events within a temporal or 
physical space. We estimate a baseline model and then a model with covariates.  By way 
of brief review, Poisson models are estimated using maximum likelihood, where the 
predicted rate is a function of the observed rate given an exposure to conditions X: 
Pr(Yit = yit|xit) 
 Negative binomial models operate in the same way, with the addition of a 
dispersion parameter i: 
Pr(Yit = yit|xit,i) 
 For random effects negative binomial models, i is allowed to vary randomly 
across groups.160 
 In this study, Yit represents counts of a) trespass stops; b) trespass arrests; and c) 
total trespass measures (stops plus arrests). The vector of independent variables xit 
includes a dummy variable for public housing, a demographic factor, controls for 
population and building composition, and a series of dummy variables corresponding to 
years. Crime complaint reports (lagged by one year) are included as exposure variables, 
and standard errors are calculated using the bootstrap method. 
 Next, we decompose the observed differences between public housing and the 
surrounding areas by estimating a series of difference-in-difference models, or DD 
models.161 DD models are commonly used to organize data to mimic experimental 
        
160
161 Alberto Abadie, Semiparametric Difference-in-Differences Estimators, 72 REV.  ECON. STUD. 1 (2005); 
Marianne Bertrand, Esther Duflo & Sendhil Mullainathan, How Much Should We Trust Differences-in-
Differences Estimates?, 119 Q. J. ECON. 249 (2004); Whitney Newey & Kenneth D. West, A Simple, 
Positive Semi-Definite, Heteroskedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent-Covariance Matrix, 55 
 Long, 1998 
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designs under conditions when randomization is unavailable.162 Here, we estimate a 
linear mixed model regression to determine whether the differences in any of the trespass 
measures are predicted by differences between public housing sites and their surrounding 
areas in the crime or socioeconomic conditions.   First, we assume 
Yit = β0 + β1*t + β2Sit + β3Xit  + ε 
where:  
(1) Yit = the difference in trespass arrests (or stops or totals) in site i and time t 
between public housing sites and the surrounding neighborhoods 
(2) β1 estimates the linear time trend 
(3) β2 estimates the effects of the difference in various crime conditions (drugs 
and weapons) between public housing and the surrounding area, and  
(4) β3 estimates the difference in a vector of demographic variables between 
public housing and the surrounding area 
 We use linear mixed effects regressions on first differences using population-
averaged models with robust standard errors and fixed effects for years. In addition to 
baseline models and models with covariates, we also estimate models with each public 
housing site (and its surrounding area) nested within boroughs and for police precincts.  
Mixed effects regressions allow for the inclusion of both fixed and random effects, and in 
effect allow us to nest variables to identify the conditioning effects of the nesting variable 
(in this case, borough or precinct) on the nested outcome (here, the first difference in the 
trespass arrest rate).163 Nesting acknowledges the influence of the administrative 
structure for the NYPD’s patrol services, including the vertical patrols that are the core of 
TAP.  Vertical patrols in public housing are done by special housing division officers 




162 See, e.g.,  Susan Athey and Guido Imbens, Identification and Inference in Nonlinear Difference-in-
Differences Models, 74 ECONOMETRICA 431 (2006); David Card and Alan B. David and Krueger, Minimum 
Wages and Employment: A Case Study of the Fast-Food Industry in New Jersey and Pennsylvania, 84 
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 772 (1994); Jacqueline Cohen and Jens Ludwig, Policing Crime Guns, in 
JENS LUDWIG AND PHILIP COOK (eds.), EVALUATING POLICIES TO REDUCE GUN 
LENCE: THE EFFECTS OF REGULATION AND ENFORCEMENT, 217, 2003. 
NOMETRICA 703 (1987); JAMES H. STOCK AND MARK W. WATSON, INTRODUCTION TO 
NOMETRICS, Chapter 8  (2003).   
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commands.164  Officers conducting vertical patrols in the surrounding areas are assigned 
to precincts.  Precincts in turn are organizationally nested in borough commands, 
although they also operate separately from borough commands for some functions such 
as detective work. 
 The third analysis tests for reciprocity in trespass enforcement between public 
housing and the surrounding areas.  The temporal component of the panel design 
provides leverage to observe how prior levels of enforcement in one area influence future 
levels in the other area, and vice versa.  Enforcement in the two areas could be 
endogenous: an increase in enforcement in one place could be simultaneous with a rise in 
the adjacent area, and spuriously tied to some third factor that affects both, such as the 
dominant culture in the police agency, in turn producing correlated error terms and a 
“simultaneity bias.”165  
We use cross-lagged regression models to examine the independence of trespass 
enforcement in the two areas, or to identify reciprocal causal effects in the presence of 
endogeneity.166  Independence would suggest that public housing is a specific target for 
trespass enforcement, unrelated to enforcement in the surrounding area.  Reciprocity, or 
significant relationships between enforcement in the two areas, on the other hand, would 
indicate that the two are part of an integrated strategy with shared origins in an 
institutional dimension of policing or in shared crime problems or both. Cross-lagged 
models correspond to a Granger test for causality in panel data.  Essentially, a variable 
“Granger causes” the other if any value of the first variable at time t-1 has a significant 
effect on the second variable at time t, controlling for the prior values of the second 
variable.167 
 The simplest cross-lagged form is the two-period model, where two variables, X 
and Y, are measured at two time points, producing four measures: X1, X2, Y1, and Y2. 
agged models may be presented as follows: 
        
164 New York City has five boroughs. Four are among the ten most populous U.S. cities: Kings County 
(Brooklyn), Queens County, Bronx County, and New York County (Manhattan).  The fifth borough, Staten 
nd, has a population equivalent to a mid-size American city. Isla
165 See, for an example, Robert J. Sampson and Jacqueline Cohen, Deterrent Effects of the Police on 
me: A Replication and Theoretical Extension, 22 LAW & SOCIETY REVIEW 163 (1988) Cri
 Steven E. Finkel, CAUSAL ANALYSIS WITH PANEL DATA (1995) 166
167 Id at 24-8.  See, also, C.W.J. Granger, Investigating Causal Relations by Econometric Models and 










 In this model, X2 is hypothesized to be a function of its period 1 value (X1), the 
lagged value of the other variable (Y1) and an error term (U1). The functional form for Y2 
is the same. The correlation between the period 1 variables is represented by Ρ1, while 
ΡU1U2 represents the correlation between the period 2 residuals. If all of the variables are 
standardized, intercept terms are eliminated and the structural equations may be written 
as: 
X2 = β1X1 + β4Y1 + U1 
 
Y2 = β2Y1 + β3X1 + U2 
 
The β3 and β4 coefficients may be used to assess reciprocal effects.  
 The two-period model can be extended across three (or more) periods.  Figure 3 















 If the panel periods are equally spaced (as they are in this study), the respective 
coefficients should be equal across periods. That is, the cross-lagged effects between 
variables from period 1 to period 2 should be the same as those between periods 2 and 3 
(Finkel, 1995). The model can then be estimated using the following parameter 
constraints:  
ß1 = ß5 = ß9,  
ß2 = ß6 = ß10,  
ß3 = ß7 = ß11, and  
ß4 = ß8 = ß12.  
 
 In this analysis the covariances between the residuals is also assumed to be equal 
across periods 2, 3, and 4, so that ΡU3U4 = ΡU5U6 = ΡU7U8.  
 The model can be further extended to include a vector of covariates (Zk). Thus, 
each of the Xs and Ys is predicted by a structural equation consisting of its own lagged 
value, the lagged value of the other variable (Y for X, X for Y), a vector of covariates 
(Zk), and an error term:  
Y2 = 2Y1 + 3X1 + 12Zk + U12 
Y3 = 6Y2 + 7X2 + 13Zk + U13 
Y4 = 10Y3 + 11X3 + 14Zk + U14 
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X2 = 1X1 + 4Y1 + 22Zk + U22 
X3 = 5X2 + 8Y2 + 23Zk + U23 
X4 = 9X3 + 12Y3 + 24Zk + U24 
 
 To avoid under-identification, the parameter estimates for  are constrained to be 




IV.  RESULTS 
 
A.  Public Housing in New York City 
 
NYCHA is the nation’s largest public housing authority,168 with an official 
population of over 600,000 residents in 179,000 units in 344 public housing 
developments.169  In 200, public housing in New York comprised approximately 8.5% of 
all rental housing in New York City.170  Most public housing developments are large: one 
in three has more than 1,000 units, and less than one in ten has fewer than 100 units. 
Most (65%) of the NYCHA developments were built before 1970, though most of the 
        
168 In comparison, the Chicago Housing Authority (CHA) administers 40,462 units.  After these, the 
largest PHAs include Philadelphia with 22,229 units; Baltimore with 17,119; and Boston with 14,400 units 
S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Housing Authority Profiles CITES).   (U.
169 Official population counts of public housing residents tend to undercount the total number of people 
living in public housing at any given time.  Tenants are required to register family and income information 
with the Housing Authority annually.  These figures are used to confirm eligibility for public housing, and 
in some cases are used to determine rents.  Because of these administrative guidelines, tenants do not 
always report all household members to the Housing Authority.  These Aunofficial@ residents may be 
family members or friends moving in for an extended period, or men living in otherwise female-headed 
single-parent families.  This complicates analyses that rely on these official statistics.  Comparing 1980 and 
1990 census population numbers with NYCHA tenant counts for public housing developments whose 
boundaries correspond to census block groups shows that official population numbers are consistently 
lower than census numbers on average, NYCHA population numbers were up to 30% lower than census 
nts. cou
170 Tamara Dumanovsky, Crime in Poor Places: Examining the Context of NYC’s Public Housing 
Projects,” Doctoral Dissertation, New York University Department of Sociology, 1999.  See, also, Tamara 
Dumanovsky et al., Neighborhood Contexts of Crime in New York City’s Public Housing, Presented at the 
September Research Institute on Neighborhood Effects on Low-Income Families, Joint Center for Poverty 
Research, The University of Chicago and Northwestern University (1999). 
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smaller ones were built after 1970.171 
Public housing is not randomly distributed across the five boroughs of New York 
City, nor is it randomly sited in the city’s neighborhoods.172  Over eighty-five percent of 
all public housing is in three boroughs: Brooklyn, Manhattan and the Bronx.173  This 
distribution reflects, in part, decades old decisions on where to locate public housing, as 
well as the success of locally organized opposition in the wealthier neighborhoods.174 For 
example, only a few public housing developments were constructed in Queens, a largely 
middle class residential area.  And there, the largest cluster of public housing is on the 
Rockaway peninsula, on the ocean side of Kennedy Airport, an area that is 
geographically much closer to eastern Brooklyn than to the center of Queens.  Staten 
Island, with its network of predominalty working class white residential neighborhoods, 
has only ten public housing developments. These are concentrated in the borough’s 
densely populated North Shore, near the ferry terminal that connects the island to 
Manhattan, and at some distance from the single-home residences in the hilly wooded 
neighborhoods on the island’s interior.  
In Manhattan, most developments are located above 110th Street or below 
midtown on the Lower East Side, well removed from the borough’s wealthiest 
neighborhoods and commercial centers.  Brooklyn has the most public housing in the 
city, with the largest concentrations in the heavily minority neighborhoods of 
Brownsville, Bushwick and East New York. Particularly for the larger developments in 
the “outer boroughs,” such as Queensbridge, Morrisania or Brownsville, public housing 
tends to ecologically dominate the surrounding areas, suggesting that some areas are 
“public housing neighborhoods.”175  These also are the neighborhoods with the most 
        
171 See, e.g., Peter Marcuse, Peter Marcuse, Interpreting Public Housing History, 12 JOURNAL OF 
HITECTURAL AND PLANNING RESEARCH 240 (1995) ARC
172 Jeffrey Fagan, & Garth Davies, Crime in Public Housing: Two Way Diffusion Effects, in Analyzing 
Crime Patterns : Frontiers of Practice (V. Goldsmith et al., eds.) 121  (1999). See, also, Garth Davies, 
Social Ecology and the Diffusion of Crime and Violence In and Around Public Housing in New York City.  
toral Dissertation, School of Criminal Justice, Rutgers University (2003). Doc
 NYCHA website.  173
174 Marcuse, supra note _; Susan Saegert, Gary Winkel, and H. Swartz, Social Capital and the 
Revitalization of New York City’s Distressed Inner-City Neighborhoods, 9 HOUSING POLICY DEBATE 17 
98). (19




intensive police surveillance and highest rates of Terry stops per felony crime and per 
capita population.176 
Table 1 shows the concentrated disadvantage of both public housing 
developments and their surrounding neighborhoods compared to the rest of the city.  
Public housing and the surrounding areas have lower per capita incomes, higher 
concentrations of racial minorities, and a higher concentration of children and 
adolescents. NYCHA’s eligibility criteria for public housing narrows the range of 
incomes in public housing, but there is a large range in incomes in the surrounding areas. 
Public housing developments are also disadvantaged compared to the immediate 
surrounding areas, but far less so compared to the rest of the city. 
 
Table 1 Here 
 
Despite their structural similarities, crime rates in public housing are higher than 
in the surrounding neighborhoods.  Assuming that enforcement is distributed 
proportionately (though not necessarily monotonically) with crime, the enforcement 
differentials are far greater than would be predicted by the narrow crime rate differences 
with the surrounding areas.   The large standard deviations in the crime rates in public 
housing suggest that there is quite a bit of variation in these rates across developments, 
far more variation than in the surrounding areas. 
 
B.  Trespass Enforcement in Public Housing 
 
1.  Relative Incidence of Trespass Enforcement 
 For each dimension of trespass enforcement, we estimated baseline models with 
fixed effects for time and an exposure variable, and then models that included covariates 
that control for relevant features of the social and built environments in each space. The 
parameter estimates in Table 2 are exponentiated coefficients, and the results can be 
interpreted as an incidence rate ratio (IRR), where a coefficient of 1 means that there is 
no difference in the rates for each increment of the predictor. 
        
176 Fagan et al., Street Stops and Broken Windows Revisited, in Exploring Race, Ethnicity and 




Table 2 Here 
 
 As expected, trespass enforcement is significantly greater in public housing than 
in the immediate surrounding areas. Table 2 shows that rates of trespass stops, arrests and 
total enforcement are about twice the rates in the surrounding areas. In all three models, 
the effects are not moderated by the inclusion of covariates.  In fact, the covariates are 
only significant in the model for stops, and even then their IRRs are clustered close to 
one.  This inelasticity in the models when covariates are entered suggests that the 
uniqueness if not separateness of trespass enforcement in public housing. 
 The small influence of the covariates is not surprising, for two reasons. First, 
public housing and its surrounding neighborhoods are, with the exception of places like 
Chelsea Houses and 344 East 28th Street, as well as some of the sites with predominantly 
elderly residents, located in neighborhoods that aren’t that dissimilar in terms of their 
social ecology and built environments.  Second, to the extent that crime is correlated with 
these covariates, most of the variance from these covariates is expressed in the crime 
exposure variables. 
 The exposure measure in these models is drug crime, which is an index of crime 
complaints to the police for drug selling and drug use.  The index includes both 
controlled substances and marijuana offenses, plus drug paraphernalia.177   We chose 
drug crimes because of the tight fit of drug crimes with the policy logic of the trespass 
program, and also because of its centrality in the discourse on the problemmatics of 
public housing both in New York and in other major cities.178 The results are robust to 
alternate specifications using violent crime complaints and weapons complaints, as well 
as total crime complaints.179 
 
Figure 5 Here 
        
177 Even when there are probable cause arrests that are not initiated by a crime complaint, the police “back 
 the crime complaint records to generate a crime to match that arrest. fill”
178 See, e.g., Sudhir Aladi Venkatesh, AMERICAN PROJECT (2002).  See, also, Jeffrey Fagan et al., 
g Control in Public Housing: The Paradox of the Drug Elimination Program in New York City, 13 
RGETOWN JOURNAL OF POVERTY, LAW & POLICY 415 (2007). 
Dru
GEO
179 These include felonies and misdemeanors, as well as many violations that can be characterized as 




 The effect sizes and ranges from the regressions in Table 2 are shown in Figure 5.  
Each block shows the mean effect size, and the range falling within one standard 
deviation of the mean.  The “whiskers” in the plot are the observed ranges across the 264 
pairs.  Adjusting the incidence rate to include the influences of covariates broadens the 
ranges compared to model with only time and exposure measures, and suggests the 
variability in the distribution of trespass enforcement.   
 
2.  Decomposing Rate Differences 
 To identify the factors in public housing and the surrounding areas that explain 
the observed differences in trespass enforcement, we estimate a series of difference-in-
difference (DD) regressions that included the full range of predictors.   Separate models 
are estimated for each dimension of trespass enforcement.  For each model, we estimate 
separate models for all sites, and then for trespass effects with public housing sites (and 
the surrounding areas) nested within boroughs and then within precincts.  DD regressions 
usually are estimated as ordinary least squares regressions.  But in this case, the uneven 
geographical siting of public housing and its nesting of sites within boroughs and 
precincts suggested that we use hierarchical or mixed effects regressions.180  In addition 
to nesting sites within boroughs or precincts, all models also are estimated with fixed 
effects for time and either borough or precinct.   
 
 a.  Stops 
 For trespass stops, the difference in Black population between public housing and 
the surrounding area predicts the difference in trespass enforcement in two of three tests 
in Table 3a.   When sites are nested in boroughs, the difference in percent Black 
population is no longer significant, but the difference is significant when sites are nested 
in police precincts.  There are no significant effects for Hispanic population or for other 
race populations.  
 
Table 3a Here 
        
180 Andrew Gelman and Jennifer Collins, Data Analysis Using Regression and Multilevel Hierarchical 
Models (2007). 
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 The effect for Blacks is present after controlling for differences in crime and 
social conditions and other features of the built environment. The effects for Black 
population differences are small compared to other predictors, especially the coefficients 
for drug crime rates or weapons offenses. Most of the other social or demographic 
characteristics are not significant, probably a reflection of the robust relationship of 
poverty to crime.  In all three specifications, trespass stop rates are higher in sites with a 
higher presence of minors (below age 16), and when population (logged) are greater, 
compared to the surrounding areas.  In two models, there are more stops in public 
housing when there are fewer tall buildings in the public housing sites compared to the 
surrounding areas.  The effects here too are small compared to crime effects, but still 
significant in both the borough and precinct models.   
 The fact that Black population remains significant after controlling for crime and 
its correlates suggests that the separateness of trespass enforcement that we observed in 
Table 2 is manifested in the concentration of Black population.  The same is not true for 
Hispanics, a question that we return to below.  
 
 b.  Trespass Arrests 
 As with trespass stops, trespass arrests are higher in public housing when Black 
populations are greater in surrounding areas (Table 3b).  The result is robust to nesting in 
either boroughs or police precincts.  There now is a significant effect for both Hispanic 
population and for other racial and ethnic groups, but only in the specification where 
public housing is nested in precincts. Otherwise, the overall pattern of results is similar to 
the results for trespass stops, and confirms the presence of a race effect.   
 
Table 3b and 3c Here 
 
 c.  Total Trespass Enforcement 
 The results for total trespass enforcement are similar to the results for stops alone 
(Table 3c).  Trespass enforcement is greater when there is a greater difference in Black 
populations, but not for Hispanic or other race populations. Again, there are small but 
significant effects for built environment and for the presence of minors, and for public 
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housing sites that are larger than their surrouinding areas. The results are similar when 
public housing sites are nested in boroughs or police precincts, or when they are not 
nested at all. 
 Beyond racial disparity, the largest effects in all three models are from crime, 
especially drug crime.  Differences in drug crime rates between public housing and the 
surrounding areas predict higher trespass stop and arrest rates in public housing.   This is 
not surprising, given the targeting of vertical patrols and “Operation Clean Hallways” on 
the elimination of drug trafficking.   
 What is surprising is that the effects vary for Black and Hispanic populations.  
Why are differences significant for Black population and not Hispanics?  At first glance, 
Hispanics and Blacks have similar presence in public housing, separated by about five 
percentage points.  And the rates are similar in the surrounding areas, too, though the 
difference is reversed.  There are no obvious structural reasons: income, for example, is 
comparable for families in each population group in public housing.  The same is true for 
crime: crime rates – both drugs and weapons – covary with both Hispanic and Black 
population concentration.  So too do other crime measures, especially violent crimes 
including robbery and assault.   Nor are there differences in the siting of public housing 
projects by neighborhood – housing projects with higher Black populations are no more 
likely to be sited in predominantly white neighborhoods than are projects where Hispanic 
populations are higher.  
 So, if structural conditions don’t predict the disproportionate rates of trespass 
enforcement where Blacks are a greater presence in public housing, and these differences 
persist after controlling for crime rates and any unobserved effects in the immediate 
police precincts, what might?  One reason may be the patterns of racial residential 
segregation in the City, and how those patterns interact with the siting of public housing.  
More likely, though, are the differential patterns of residential segregation for Hispanics 
and Blacks in New York,181 and the diversity of Hispanic populations in New York.182  
Hispanics in New York include many more first generation immigrants who, by virtue of 
        
181 We did not separately analyze Black Hispanics, since we are not confident in the reliability of coding of 
ck Hispanic suspects by NYPD officers making either stops or arrests in public housing. Bla




citizenship, are excluded from public housing, and live in non-public housing areas such 
as Sunset Park in Brooklyn. 
 But an alternative explanation may simply be race.  In other analyses of SQF 
stops, Blacks are stopped at far higher rates than are Hispanics.183  They also are more 
likely to be frisked once stopped, and arrested as well.184  A growing body of research 
suggests that skin shade matters in discrimination,185 and both the cognitive and implicit 
biases associated with Blacks as criminal suspects may be greater, with a differential 
large enough to produce meaningful differences.  The patterns we observe here may 
reflect the aggregation of such biases, and the attribution of race-based priors onto places 
that bear the aggregate characteristic of their residents. 
 
3.  Autonomy or Reciprocity 
 The concentration of trespass enforcement in public housing could reflect a 
targeting of enforcement in public housing, or could simply be one end of a continuum or 
gradient where enforcement “moves” between the surrounding areas and the surrounding 
area depending on the extent of differences between the two “neighborhoods.”  In this 
framework, differences in enforcement between public housing and the surrounding area 
would covary with the magnitude of differences between those them.  At one extreme, 
trespass enforcement would be concentrated in public housing and independent of 
enforcement patterns in the surrounding areas.  When differences are small, trespass 
enforcement would be dependent between the two areas, and we would be able to 
empirically identify mutuality and reciprocal causation. 
 The cross-lag regressions are designed to identify reciprocal causation or 
independence.  Figures 6a-c show the results of three tests, parallel to the tests in Tables 
3a-c of each dimension of trespass enforcement.  In each set of regressions, we control 
for lagged (t-1) time-covarying crime and social conditions.  
 
Figures 6a-c Here 
        
183
 Fagan, id. 
 Fagan et al., 2010; Gelman Fagan and Kiss, 2007. 
184
185 Eberhardt, Goff.  See, generally, Rick Banks on profiling 
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 The regression estimates support our suspicion that trespass enforcement in public 
housing and the surrounding areas are independent and autonomous regimes. In each of 
the figures, the regression coefficients for the year-to-year influence within both public 
housing sites or within the surrounding neighborhoods are very high, and obviously 
significant.  These coefficients show the time path of trespass enforcement within each 
spatial unit in relation to its past values.  For example, the regression coefficient for T2 
trespass stops in public housing from T1 stops in public housing is =32.75, p<.001.  
(Recall that these coefficients are assumed to be equal across periods because the periods 
are equally spaced over time, and exposure is relatively constant186).  The parallel 
estimate for the surrounding neighborhood is =18.38, p<.001.  So, there is strong 
stability in trespass enforcement within spatial units from year to year.  In effect, the 
system is stable (in a statistical sense) to the point where it could reach a fixed 
equilibrium at some future point where the values of  will be constant (even if we don’t 
fix them by virtue of the spacing of time periods), though this seems to be somewhat 
speculative at this point.187 We observe similarly high within-area regression coefficients 
over time in Figures 6b and 6c for the within-unit effects. 
 There also is good evidence that enforcement in both public housing and the 
surrounding areas are well correlated. For example, Figure 6a shows that for the 
relationship between trespass stops in public housing and the surrounding area, =3.76, 
p<.001. That particular parameter increases over time to 8.05 for 2006-8, again 
statistically significant. For trespass arrests, this effect is stable over time (Figure 6b).  
This stability is characteristic of many social systems, where change is both slow and 
highly dependent on changes in connected social networks and systems.188  Thus, for 
both mathematical and conceptual reasons, the significant and relatively stable year-to-
year correlations between public housing and the surrounding areas are hardly surprising.  
Both spatial units share crime and social structural ecological characteristics, and are 
        
186
187 Finkel, supra note _ at 9. For now, we cannot claim that these systems have reached that equilibrium, 
 we expect to see short-term fluctuations based on exogenous factors such as reductions in police 
onnel or adoption of new tactical initiatives. 
 See, Finkel, supra note _. 
and
pers
188 James S. Coleman,  The Mathematical Study of Change, in Methodology in Social Research (Hubert 




joint tenants in a larger political economy of neighborhoods that is, more often than not, 
characterized by social and economic disadvantage.189  
 Though correlated by virtue of their proximity to crime and other indicia of 
deprivation, our effort to identify mutual or reciprocal influence shows that there is 
almost no evidence that enforcement patterns in either spatial unit is influencing its next 
door neighbor. In any of the panel years, the coefficients for the cross-lagged regressions, 
from public housing in T1 to the surrounding neighborhood in T2, or from the 
surrounding neighborhood in T1 to the adjacent public housing site in T2, are generally 
small and statistically not significant.  The only exception is for trespass stops (Figure 
5a), where the cross-lag regression coefficients are significant for the 2007-8 period.  In 
all other specifications across the three sets of analyses in Figures 6a-c, the results are not 
significant.  
 The absence of significant cross-lag regressions, then, suggests that trespass 
enforcement in public housing is independent from enforcement in the surrounding areas.  
Tying this analysis back to the DD estimates in Table 3a-c or the “raw” estimates in 
Table 2, we see near stability in the effects over time in part because the first difference 
change in any measure of Y is nearly constant over time across units.  In ordinary terms, 
the difference between public housing and the surrounding area seems to be constant and 
fixed. Accordingly, any differences we observe in trespass enforcement either in the 
overall comparison in Table 2, or the decomposed differences analysis in Tables 3a-c, is 
evidence of a specific process within public housing that is independent of trespass 
enforcement in the surrounding areas, that produces a disparate impact on public housing 
residents, and especially places with higher concentrations of Black residents.  
Notwithstanding any advantages or disadvantages in public safety that may accrue from 
this process over time, trespass enforcement seems to be structured into the fabric of 
public housing, especially those places where Black residents are the majority population 
group, placing both its residents and visitors under a firm police gaze. 
        
189 For the most part, both public housing and its surrounding areas are located in poorer and higher 
crime areas of the city.  Jeffrey Fagan, Tamara Dumanovsky, J. Phillip Thompson and Garth Davies, Crime 
in public housing: Clarifying research issues, National Institute of Justice Journal 2–9 (1998, March). See, 
also, Dumanovsky, Crime in Poor Places, supra note _.  
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V.  CONCLUSION 
Distributive concerns predict that public housing residents would enjoy the 
benefits of vertical patrol, and they would welcome the increased attention.  In a contest 
between depolicing and policing, policing will always win.  Accordingly, we expect at 
least some support from the community.190  Yet, numbers matter, and for residents, 
especially those uninvolved in the drug trade, the frequency of vertical patrol is daunting.  
It is quite possible for a resident to be stopped and questioned multiple times in the same 
week.191  In fact, some twenty-four percent of public housing residents surveyed reported 
being stopped more than twenty times in the past year,192 and only about one in four  
(28%) reported no stops in the previous year.193 According to the same NYLPI survey of 
the Thomas Jefferson Homes, 14.7% had been arrested for trespass.194  Residents’ 
frustration is compounded by the fact that the patrols only indirectly target the most 
serious crimes.  Instead, the vast majority of arrests are for trespass, and the connection to 
more serious crime is not apparent to residents.195  As a result of the frequency of stops, 
their tangential relationship to serious criminal conduct, and occasional mistreatment by 
       
190 Even the much more intrusive searches associated with Operation Clean Sweep in Chicago---during 
which systematic suspicionless searches of residents’ apartment buildings were conducted---garnered a 
surprising amount of community support.  See Yarosh, supra,  at 1126 (1992).  (“[T]he tenant support for 
Sweeps has been extremely strong, with few dissenters among the residents.”).  See also Dirk Johnson, 
Target Gangs that Plague Housing, N.Y. Times, May 20, 1989 (quoting one resident as saying “If you had 
somewhere to go, too bad. You stay inside.  It’s a lot better now” and another as saying “Before the 
crackdown kids couldn’t sit on the playground for [thirty] minutes [without] having to scatter because of 
the gunfire”).  Furthermore, police saturation sweeps of public housing during the late 1960s were not 
rejected by the tenants after they initially proved to be somewhat successful in reducing crime.  Bloom, 
ra, at 192.  Nevertheless, soon after residents became disillusioned by the NYPD’s tactics and would 
n try and thwart their efforts to arrested suspected criminals.  Id. 
sup
ofte
191 With only 343 housing developments across the New York City Housing Authority (NYCHA), New 
York City Housing Authority, Fact Sheet 1 (2008), available at 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/nycha/downloads/pdf/factsheet.pdf., and assuming vertical patrols are evenly 
ributed amongst the developments, the average NYCHA development sees 450 vertical patrols a year.   dist
 See NYLPI at 10. 192
193 NYLPI, supra at 10.  While this was not a scientific study and it would be inappropriate to draw 
conclusions about other residents’ experiences based on surveys conducted in only two housing projects, 
re is no reason to believe that these results are outliers. the
194 See NYLPI, supra, at 11 (showing that 30% of residents reported being arrested and 36% 
reported being ticketed by the police, with 49% of those incidents being citations or arrests for 
pass). tres
195 M. Chris Fabricant, Rousting the Cops:  One Man Stands up to the NYPD’s Apartheid-Like 
Trespassing Crackdown, The Village Voice, Oct. 30, 2007 (reporting on his case load as a public defender 




NYPD officers,196 public housing residents are ambivalent about the appropriateness and 
desirability of vertical patrols.197 In weighing the tradeoff between liberty and security 
for public housing residents, the way vertical patrols are conducted troubles residents.
 Vertical patrols regard residents as criminal suspects merely for being present 
within their own apartment buildings.  Their status as public housing residents exposes 
them and their friends and kin to unnecessary and legally questionable stops.  The 
racialization of this process compounds other racial tensions that create legitimacy 
deficits that in turn complicate the project of police-citizen cooperation in the pursuit of 
security.  Policing in public housing has the potential to be a transformative force, 
ensuring building residents feel safe and secure in their homes and broadening the ties 
between citizens and police.  It also has the potential to redistribute the benefits and 
burdens of patrol by seeking balance in how vertical patrol is conducted.  But this process 
will have to reverse decades of cognitive bias about public housing and its residents, and 













196 NYLPI, at 11 (reporting that thirty-four percent of residents have been subjected to excessive force, 
sixty-six percent reported abuse or harassment of a family member, and twenty-three percent have filed 
plaints with the Civilian Complaint Review Board). com
 See generally NYLPI.  197
198 See generally NYLPI,  at 10--13 (showing resident dissatisfaction with the frequency of stops taking 
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a. Chi‐square=1397.22, p=.000; CFI=.714; RMSEA=.094, p=.000; SRMSR=.070 
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